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I. THE LARGER PROBLEM 
The Marine Corps regularly finds itself adopting new operational concepts in 
order to adapt to new threats and changing resource conditions. The Marine air ground 
task force (MAGTF) remains at the center of these adaptations; the MAGTF is how the 
Marine Corps deploys and fights. MAGTFs consist of four elements: command element 
(CE), ground combat element (GCE), aviation combat element (ACE), and logistics 
combat element (LCE). MAGTFs are scalable as required for the mission and are 
provided in the forms (from smallest to largest) of Special Purpose MAGTF 
(SPMAGTF), Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), 
and Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). The latest Marine Corps operational concept is 
Expeditionary Force 21 (EF-21) and it is presented in a capstone concept document dated 
4 March 2014. In EF-21, the MEB is the focus of effort for force deployment with the 
expectation that MEBs will be composited from smaller MAGTFs (SPMAGTF, MEU) 
and additional forces (CMC, 2014). How the Marine Corps achieves training and 
readiness (T&R) to support the EF-21 concept under tightening resources remains a 
significant concern. 
Live, Virtual, and Constructive (LVC) training offers an exponentially greater 
number of capabilities to support MAGTF T&R than current standard live training and 
stand-alone simulators and simulation offer, specifically under resource constraints. The 
Marine Corps has demonstrated a desire to develop and implement LVC capabilities via 
the LVC-Training Environment (LVC-TE) but this desire has not been shared 
institutionally. There is then a significant danger of the Marine Corps moving forward to 
develop LVC-TE without actually meeting the needs of Marines and without proper 
integration to support EF-21.  
Since late 2013, there have been considerable gains in the LVC-TE concept and 
capability yet there remains a substantial gap for the Marine Corps to suitably develop the 
LVC-TE. Specifically, the Marine Corps lacks a full vision and strategy for development 
and implementation. To provide recommended solutions for this gap, it is necessary to 
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understand what LVC training is, why the Marine Corps desires these capabilities, and 
what the overarching problems are. 
A. WHAT IS LVC? 
LVC has become a broad term for the integration or interoperability of simulators 
and simulations (i.e., training systems) and command, control, communications, 
computers, and intelligence (C4I) systems. Current Department of Defense (DOD) 
definitions (ONR, 2011) break LVC down as: 
 Live Simulations, which represent the natural physical environment in 
which individuals or teams operate their systems and platforms for 
rehearsal and training purposes. Typically, these environments are closely 
similar to the expected operational environments, with modifications to 
the systems and platforms that support performance assessment and 
maintain range safety. 
 Virtual Simulations, which are synthetic environments that include the 
replication of warfighting equipment and operational environmental 
conditions; allows for the sharing of a common environment which 
multiple users can access; and supports interactions with simulated entities 
(including objects, avatars, and equipment) that mirror, in response 
fidelity, those that would occur in the real world. 
 Constructive Simulations which are simulated forces that respond to 
trainee actions. Typically, real human inputs are needed to fully operate 
these simulated forces which then carry out the resultant actions in a 
synthetic environment. Semi-automated Forces are one example of 
constructive simulations; Wargaming models are another example. 
As technological growth and security threats in the 21st century brought 
tremendous growth in the number of C4I systems and their capabilities, there was a 
similar impact and proliferation in training systems. LVC can become very convoluted so 
I will focus on basic tenants for the Marine Corps. To simplify the DOD definitions: live 
is real people operating real systems, virtual is real people operating simulated systems, 
and constructive is simulated people operating simulated systems. Marines are already 
well ingrained with live training—new caveats are that the Marine Corps is improving its 
abilities to instrument personnel, weapons, and other systems in order to network them 
for improved command and control (C2), diagnostics, and after action reviews (AAR). 
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Unbeknownst to many, the Marine Corps has been supporting MEB, MEF, and other 
major subordinate command (MSC) training exercises and mission rehearsals for years 
by combining live and constructive training. The new component that LVC brings is the 
full interoperability of virtual systems along with live, constructive, and C4I systems. 
This is an extremely important evolution in concept and capabilities. 
1. Live Training  
Live-fire and maneuver is certainly the most realistic tactical training for Marines. 
If you ask Marines and their leaders how they prefer to train, they will pick live training. 
Live training has constraints and limitations though. It requires weapons, vehicles, 
aircrafts, and other systems that need ammunition, fuel, and maintenance for employment 
and sustainment—this becomes resource intensive and often requires funding and time 
that the Marine Corps cannot afford. Training areas and ranges often provide limitations 
on where and how live training can be conducted—they can limit the type of weapons 
and ammunition allowed, they can limit battlefield geometry, they can limit the unit size 
and this can all lead to unrealistic employment of forces. The number of training areas 
and ranges available versus the number of units needing to use them is often not adequate 
either. Safety issues can add restrictions and additional personnel requirements. These 
constraints and limitations mean that live training (by itself) is often predictable and does 
not train the entire MAGTF for uncertainty. 
2. Live and Constructive Training  
When large commands need to conduct exercises, the necessary forces are often 
not available, so constructive forces fill the gap. This allows the commander and staff to 
execute at their level while subordinate staffs and units are simulated. Additionally, live 
and constructive training can support many joint and coalition training objectives and can 
be conducted in a distributed environment (i.e., across multiple geographic locations). 
Because constructive forces are represented within computer systems or on map boards, 
they are not physically constrained to the same training areas and ranges that live forces 
are, so the constructive aspect allows large commands to operate more realistically. The 
use of constructive forces does not mean that there is a void of additional personnel 
 4
needed—personnel are still needed to act on behalf of subordinate commanders, staff 
members, and units. Often these personnel are contractors or junior Marines serving in 
two or three levels above their normal billet and they are typically not free to make their 
own decisions but are just expected to follow the script. A negative aspect with 
constructive training then is that the higher level staff and commander are not being 
stimulated by the true thoughts and actions of subordinates. 
3. LVC Training  
The integration of virtual training systems is what distinctly sets LVC apart from 
current training capabilities. Whereas resource constraints limit live training and the lack 
of real people performing their real jobs limits constructive training, virtual training 
allows real people to perform their real jobs in less constrained environments. Through 
virtual training, a tank commander can employ forces in any geographic location, a 
battalion commander can execute C2 anywhere in the world while conducting fire 
support planning and coordination, and a pilot in Miramar, California can provide close 
air support for a Joint tactical air controller in Okinawa, Japan while they are both 
virtually immersed in North Korea. It is this latter example of virtual interoperability that 
can exponentially improve training. When multiple systems are linked together so that 
Marines are able to see and communicate with each other in the same virtual environment 
(whether in adjacent rooms or 2,000 miles apart), the Marine Corps can achieve many of 
the same qualities that make live training so advantageous but do so in the environment 
of its choosing, in a quickly repeatable and variable fashion, with fewer resource 
constraints—essentially, the Marine Corps can train as it would fight with additional time 
savings and cost avoidance. LVC can be a significant MAGTF T&R capability if fully 
integrated into the Marine Corps. 
B. WHAT IS LVC-TE? 
LVC-TE is the approved Marine Corps program to develop and employ LVC 
concepts and capabilities. Based off of a Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA), the 
LVC-TE Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) was signed by the Marine Requirements 
Oversight Council (MROC) in 2010. The LVC-TE Concept of Operations (CONOPS) 
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was recently signed on 17 July 2014 and Figure 1 provides a graphic of the LVC-TE 
operational view provided in the CONOPS; there is a clear focus on MAGTF support 
(MROC, 2010).  
 
Figure 1.  High-Level Operational Concept Graphic (OV-1) for LVC-TE 
(from TECOM, 2014) 
1. Current LVC-TE Lead Organizations 
In the development and execution of LVC-TE, Training and Education 
Capabilities Division (TECD) is the requirements sponsor for non-standard training 
systems and LVC-TE (CMC, 1991). TECD is a division under the headquarters of 
Training and Education Command (TECOM) and TECOM is a subordinate command 
under Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC). The commanding 
general (CG) of MCCDC is also Deputy Commandant (DC), Capabilities Development 
and Integration (CD&I). Figure 2 provides an overview of the CD&I and MCCDC 
organizational structure. Program Manager, Training Systems (PM TRASYS) is the 
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materiel solution manager for training systems and LVC-TE. PM TRASYS falls directly 
under Marine Corps Systems Command (MCSC). Figure 3 provides an overview of the 
MCSC organizational structure. The Office of Naval Research (ONR) is a key 
contributor to LVC-TE as a technology developer. Figure 4 provides a representation of 
the relationships between CD&I, MCSC, and ONR. 
 
Figure 2.  CD&I and MCCDC Organization Chart (from HQMC, 2012) 
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Figure 3.  MCSC and PEO Land Systems Organization Chart (from MCSC, 
2013) 
 
Figure 4.  Relationships between CD&I, MCSC, and ONR (from MCSC, 
2013) 
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2. CBA Results 
As stated in the ICD, the CBA identified four necessary capabilities for LVC-TE 
(MROC, 2010): 
a. Integrating Architecture 
Provides the ability to allow for the easy, rapid and seamless integration of the 
live, virtual and constructive domain mission partners. 
b. Integrated Dynamic Virtual and Constructive Synthetic Battlespace 
Representations 
Provides the ability to replicate entities across the full range of military operations 
(ROMO) when executing fully integrated LVC operations. 
c. Integration and Stimulation of Operational Systems 
Provides the ability for warfighters to train and execute mission rehearsal events 
utilizing their operational systems. 
d. User Services 
Provide the ability to easily and rapidly conduct collaborative planning, 
preparation, execution, and assessment for LVC training, exercise, and mission rehearsal 
events. 
These capabilities were further analyzed and 23 enterprise-level capability gaps 
were produced (MROC, 2010). These gaps are presented and discussed throughout the 
ICD and provide a foundation for the materiel solution. 
3. LVC-TE Gap Analysis 
The 23 capability gaps are important but are not necessarily essential to this 
discussion. What is essential is the further analysis conducted and presented through the 
CONOPS. In order to properly address gaps and integrate capabilities across the Marine 
Corps, DOTMLPF-P analysis are conducted. DOTMLPF-P is a standard military term 
and it is a standard military process to assess impacts across Doctrine, Organization, 
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Training, Materiel, Leadership and education, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy (CJCS, 
2012). To recognize the impact that LVC-TE will have across the Marine Corps and the 
criticality of integration, the DOTLMPF-P assessment needs to be looked at. 
Though not all-inclusive, the following items provide a number of the gaps as 
analyzed against DOTMLPF-P and presented in the CONOPS. The affected DOTMLPF-
P areas are provided in parentheses (TECOM, 2014a). 
 Lack of systems designed to support comprehensive Mission Essential 
Tasks (METs) and/or collective T&R events. (T), (M), (P), and (F) 
 Lack of federation capability training systems. (T), (P), and (F) 
 Limited understanding of LVC-TE linkages. (T) 
 Lack of the means for MAGTF distributed training, exercise and 
education. (O), (M) and (F) 
 Lack of systems for integrating training, exercise, and education 
capabilities across LVC-TE domains to support multi-echelon 
(horizontal/vertical integration) training throughout the MAGTF. (O) and 
(M) 
 Lack of an existing, integrating architecture. (D), (M) and (F) 
 Lack of realistic or incomplete entity behaviors. (M) and (P) 
 Lack of required M&S entity fidelity and resolution. (M) 
 Lack of a complete set of Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic 
and Political, Military, Economic, Societal, Information, Infrastructure 
(DIME/PMESII) entities. (M) 
 Lack of a federated dynamic virtual and constructive synthetic 
interoperable distributed operational environment. (D), (M) and (F) 
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 Lack of specific terrain coverage, as needed. (M) 
 Lack of adequate terrain scale, accuracy, and resolution. (M) 
 Lack of an ability to federate and stimulate operational systems. (M) 
 Lack of the ability to easily and rapidly conduct collaborative planning, 
preparation, execution and assessment for exercise, training, and mission 
rehearsal events. (O), (T), (L), (P) and (F) 
 Lack of common and comprehensive scenario development tool. (M) and 
(P) 
 Lack of a Marine Corps policy for training simulation system Verification, 
Validation, and Accreditation (VV&A). (D) and (L) 
 Lack of MAGTF Collective T&R events. (D), (O), (P) and (L) 
 Lack of existing authoritative training support data sources. (T) 
 Lack of existing collaborative network policies and/or incomplete policy 
and procedures for establishing collaborative training and education 
networks. (T) & (P) 
 Lack of a training and education policy for the development of standards-
based LVC-TE. (D), (L), (T) and (P) 
 Lack of policy and benefits for LVC-TE capabilities for the total force. 
(D), (O), (L) and (P) 
 Lack of collaborative networks, with adequate Quality of Service (QoS) 
characteristics to support collaborative training and education 
environments. (M) 
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 Lack of MLS that prevents systems from obtaining access to existing 
networks. (M) and (P) 
 Lack of established Information Assurance (IA) Certification and 
Accreditation (C&A), and requirements that prevents systems from 
obtaining access to existing networks for simulations and simulators. (O), 
(L) 
The extent of these gaps presents a clear picture that LVC-TE will have an impact 
across the Marine Corps—from junior to senior Marines, from individuals to MEFs, from 
entry level schoolhouses to professional military education, and from forming units to 
deployed units. This information alone is not substantial enough to secure the necessary 
resources and institutional will in order to mitigate or eliminate these gaps—a clear 
demand signal is necessary as well. 
4. LVC-TE Demand Signal 
Marines rarely take action because of internal reasons, in almost all cases, 
Marines act because of an external pressure. That pressure can come from a superior, an 
operations order, doctrine or policy, more funding, less funding, peers, the enemy, media, 
or subordinates just to name a few sources. This pressure is often deemed a “demand 
signal” and it has been a recently increasing demand signal for LVC-TE that has allowed 
concepts from 2010 and before to finally start generating into capabilities with increased 
levels of resources. 
a. I MEF 
In 2013, dissatisfied with the Marine Corps’ pace of LVC-TE development, the 
CG of I MEF reached out to PM TRASYS for technical assistance to more quickly 
develop internal LVC capabilities. His vision and intent (shown in Figure 5) was 
presented at the I MEF LVC Problem Framing and Observations brief (I MEF, 2013). 
From December 2013 to August 2014, PM TRASYS (with numerous other stakeholders) 
proceeded to support I MEF’s goals (presented in Chapter III). Most importantly, this 
demand signal from CG I MEF allowed for additional resources to be applied to LVC-TE 
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both for the purpose of re-igniting program documentation (i.e. CONOPS, architecture, 
and the Capabilities Development Document (CDD)) efforts and funds to support I MEF 
related efforts. 
 
Figure 5.  I MEF Commander’s LVC vision (from I MEF, 2013) 
b. II and III MEF 
In conjunction with I MEF’s direct demand signal for LVC capabilities, the other 
MEFs and Marine Forces provided a demand signal with regards to stand-alone training 
systems capabilities. The other two MEFs, II MEF and III MEF, have provided a demand 
signal as well. Figure 6 presents some of II MEF’s desire per their response to the LVC-
TE CONOPS tasker (discussed in Paragraph I.C) and Figure 7 is from a III MEF 
presentation to TECOM regarding their focus on distributed capabilities (TECOM, 
2014a) (III MEF, 2013).   
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Figure 6.  II MEF LVC-TE Demand Signal (from TECOM, 2014) 
 
Figure 7.  III MEF LVC-TE Demand Signal (from III MEF, 2013) 
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All three MEFs have different forces assigned, different areas of operation (AO), 
and different mission priorities, so one of the continual challenges is in providing these 
three distinct MEFs with a common capability that supports them all well. 
c. Enduring Collective Training Requirement  
With budgets being cut across all funding lines, operations and management funds 
for many of the training systems were scheduled to be cut significantly (to $0 in some 
cases) in Fiscal Year 2014 (FY14). As these training systems provided the capability to 
fill the gaps caused from reduced funding for some live training, the MEF’s and Marine 
Forces sent a demand signal that funding levels needed to be improved. From October to 
December 2013 (as shown in Figure 8), the Marine Corps sought to identify which 
systems had the greatest priority and how much funding was enough to meet MEF and 
MARFOR requirements. This meant that a subject (training systems), that had previously 
been obscure from many conversations, was now receiving the attention of 3-star general 
officers. Deemed the Enduring Collective Training Requirements Working Group (WG), 
the expressed purpose was to “ENSURE [OPERATING FORCE] REQUIREMENTS 
FOR SIMULATIONS AND TRAINING DEVICES ARE IDENTIFIED AND 
DOCUMENTED.” (Capabilities Development and Integration (CEAB), 2013). The 
results provided improved funding for maintaining operational funds for Supporting 
Arms Virtual Trainer (SAVT) sites and wet egress trainers (simulators for vehicles and 
helicopters in the water) plus an increase in contractors for simulation services that 
support major exercises and MEF training (TECOM, 2014b). 
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Figure 8.  Enduring Collective Training Requirements timeline (from 
CEAB, 2013) 
d. Government Accountability Office 
In an August 2013 Government Accountability Office report (GAO-13–698), the 
GAO acknowledged that the Army and Marine Corps have increased their use of 
simulators and computer-based simulations over the past decades but concluded that both 
services lack the ability to make fully informed decisions about whether training 
requirements can be met with live and simulation-based training. In essence, this report 
provided an effective demand signal from the Federal Government that training systems 
are important enough for the services to invest more resources into but that the 
investment needs to be more systematically executed. Specifically, the GAO 
recommended two actions: 1) develop outcome-oriented performance metrics that can be 
used to assess the impact of simulation-based training on improving the performance or 
proficiency of service members and units, and 2) develop a methodology—to include 
identifying the costs that should be included and how these costs should be captured—for 
comparing the costs associated with the use of live and simulation-based training (GAO, 
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2013). In response to this report, the Marine Corps initiated a two-year study in 
December 2013 to assess what the “right size” is for training systems in the Marine Corps 
(Capabilities Development and Integration (OAD), 2013). 
5. Current LVC-TE Vision 
There are current vision statements and products for LVC-TE. Initially provided 
as part of a LVC-TE in progress review to CG TECOM in September 2013, Figure 9 
provides a view of current Marine Corps training systems and their linkages and Figure 
10 provides a view of desired linkages. Figure 11 demonstrates a concept for how LVC-
TE capabilities will support the Marine Corps training continuum (TECD, 2014).   
 
Figure 9.  Current view of USMC LVC Capabilities (from TECD, 2014) 
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Figure 10.  Desired USMC LVC linkages (from TECD, 2014) 
 
Figure 11.  LVC application across Training Continuum (from TECD, 2014) 
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These figures are available on the TECD website along with the vision statement 
below: 
“The Live, Virtual and Constructive-Training Environment (LVC-TE) is 
envisioned as a transformational capability that will federate diverse 
training and exercise programs to meet individual, unit, and collective 
warfighting requirements to maintain relevancy, agility, and adaptability. 
The Marines’ long-established adaptability includes a capacity to learn on 
the job, based on a unique expeditionary mindset that will become an even 
more valuable asset in the years ahead, especially as the service adapts and 
builds on its historic role as the nation’s crisis response force capable of 
operating in diverse environments, including those requiring forcible 
entry.” (TECD, 2014) 
Additionally, the LVC-TE CONOPS has a vision statement as well: 
“The Marine Corps endeavors to optimize the Corps’ Operating Forces, 
support and sustainment base, and unique capabilities to respond to the 
complex spectrum of crises, conflicts, and expeditionary operations in 
urban littorals. In reality, most crises will occur unexpectedly and with 
minimal warning. Therefore, the MAGTF must have an expanding range 
of operational and tactical options. It is envisioned that by utilizing LVC-
TE, the capability to leverage existing training organizations, 
technologies, and facilities to optimize and expand those options will be 
realized. The Battle Simulation Centers, Combined Arms Staff Trainers, 
Training Support Centers, etc., will play a vital role in ensuring units 
understand and capitalize on the benefits that LVC-TE training provides. 
Further, there will be potential savings in time, money and increased 
efficiency.” (TECOM, 2014a) 
Though pictures should often tell a thousand words, these products and statements 
unfortunately fall short of providing a vision that properly accounts for all of the 
institutional gaps and do not provide bold and far-reaching objectives for the Marine 
Corps to achieve. 
6. Current LVC-TE Strategy? 
I am hesitant to say that it is the LVC-TE strategy but it is important to 
acknowledge that LVC-TE has been properly addressed in TECOM’s campaign plans. It 
is also important because issues that have been highlighted in the past remain relevant 
issues today because no one from the TECOM or higher level has been addressing those 
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issues. In order to highlight this, the following information is provided from Appendix A 
of the Training and Education Command Campaign Plan 2011–2016 (TECOM, 2011). 
a. Objective T3. Increase organizational efficiencies by systematically 
improving and institutionalizing core processes…  
b. Initiative T.3.d Implement policies, orders, and directives to govern the 
integration of a L-V-C learning environment 
(1)  Who will plan and carry out this Initiative? 
 –Lead responsibility: TBD 
  Participation/support from:  G-3, MTSD, MSTP, TCOM, MAGTF-TC, 
(2) When will it be implemented? 
 – FY12 Development Phase 
 – FY13–16 Implementation Phase 
(3) Dependent Initiatives - for which coordination is needed: 
 PR1a. Execute a MAGTF Training Program 
 PR1b. Develop and implement a MAGTF T&R in accordance with T&R 
Manual to serve as the capstone T&R Manual 
 PR1d. Plan and facilitate a MEU PTP 
 PR3a.Provide students with a world-class university 
 T1e. Plan infrastructure in support of an integrated L-V-C learning 
environment 
 T3e. Plan for training and education centers at all major installations 
 T2a. Develop a network capability to integrate diverse training and 
education programs 
 T3b Develop, implement, and assess core processes 
 T1f. Design, Develop, Deliver, Distance Learning solutions and programs 
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 PR2a. Implement a MAGTF Command Element T&R Program and 
sustain Ground and Aviation T&R Programs for individual skill 
progression and resource identification 
 T1a. Improve and sustain simulations, simulators, instrumented systems, 
and automated ranges to enable more effective and efficient individual and 
collective training and education 
(4) Implementation Steps for this Initiative: 
  Analyze current L-V-C-TE and DL applications 
 Survey of existing level of integration across the L-V-C-TE and DL 
domains, identify gaps, redundancies, overlaps 
 Analysis of efficiencies derived/implied 
 Analysis of present costs 
 Identify potential areas of future integration 
 Perform cost-benefit analysis for enhanced integration 
 Develop and promulgate policy within the T&E enterprise 
 Market integration activities to operational forces for integration into 
individual/collective training execution 
 Implement the MAGTF-TP Order 
(5) Potential Barriers to Implementing this Initiative: 
 Organizational resistance to moving away from traditional approaches to 
training certain skills (ex. preferences for live tank gunnery, CAX etc.) 
 Funding to baseline enabling architecture (Opfunds, MILCON, 
conservative fiscal environment) 
 Allocation/programming of sustainment funding 
While not as all-inclusive of a strategy as is needed for LVC-TE, these elements 
do a good job of identifying many of the intricacies and institutional barriers that exist. 
The one item that is missing within the above list that is still currently missing for the 
Marine Corps is someone to serve as the lead for LVC-TE implementation. Noted as 
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TBD (to be determined) in the TECOM Campaign Plan, this function remains a gap and 
will likely not be properly addressed until a CIO is assigned. 
C. LVC-TE INSTITUTIONAL GAPS 
Throughout early 2014, TECD worked through the Marine Corps Action 
Tracking System (MCATS) to develop the LVC-TE CONOPS. This CONOPS was 
developed with input from commands and organizations throughout the Marine Corps 
and provides a concept for the application of LVC-TE but this concept is narrowly 
focused and that actuality continues to highlight the Marine Corps’ institutional gaps. The 
LVC-TE ICD states that it is focused on addressing the materiel gaps of the DOTMLPF 
analysis and the CONOPS is narrowly focused because it captures near-term capability 
needs and continues to ignore long-term capabilities. With the incredibly fast cycle at 
which the world’s technology (hardware and software) changes, the Marine Corps cannot 
succeed with planning that is only focused on near-term capability needs. Before laying 
out a long-term vision and strategy for LVC-TE, I want to first highlight what those key 
DOTMLPF gaps are that need to be addressed through integrated planning. 
1. Materiel and Facilities  
While there are costs necessary to achieve materiel and facility capabilities under 
LVC-TE, the majority of those costs are currently accounted for in the Future Years 
Defense Plan (FYDP). Through the FYDP process, the services identify the programs and 
associated funding that they need in order to be ready and to accomplish the mission. 
Figure 12 provides the past and current financial outlook for PM TRASYS with respect  
 22
 
Figure 12.  PM TRASYS FY09-FY18 Funding Plan (from PM TRASYS, 
2014b) 
to the FYDP. Funding was much higher in recent years in order to provide new systems 
and support high-cost programs like ethnic role-players for deploying units. The funding 
in FY14 and beyond looks insufficient in comparison but the reality is that this planned 
funding is focused on sustaining and upgrading those current training systems that are 
already fielded. Though LVC-TE is not currently established as a separate program with 
its own funding, the Marine Corps does know that near-term LVC-TE capabilities can be 
achieved through modifications to current C4I and stand-alone training systems that are 
established programs with funding (demonstrated at LSE-14). Those C4I and training 
systems though do not have written requirements to work with in order to achieve near-
term LVC-TE capabilities. This means that those program offices are executing current 
requirements that may be archaic compared to LVC-TE requirements or that may delay 
the opportunity to institute LVC-TE capabilities. The same goes for current plans for 
modifications to facilities or new military construction. Current facility plans were 
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developed prior to the LVC-TE CONOPS development and certainly without a long-term 
LVC-TE vision and strategy in place. With this disconnection, how does the Marine 
Corps expect to ensure that LVC-TE does not suffer in later years because of poorly 
planned infrastructure capabilities?  This question, and many others, exists because the 
Marine Corps does not have prioritized LVC-TE requirements against the FYDP and is 
not following a process to ensure that requirements are integrated and synchronized 
across training systems, C4I systems, ships, and military construction. 
2. Training, Leadership and Education  
In order to develop and employ LVC-TE’s robust capabilities, the Marine Corps, 
particularly mid-level and senior leadership, must become inculcated with LVC-TE. The 
Marine Corps can institutionally achieve this through training and education (T&E) but a 
cultural gap exists here more so than a capability gap. Though the Marine Corps has an 
increased number of training systems available to support training from the individual to 
MEF level, it is a small number of Marines who routinely utilize these systems as 
demonstrated by annual usage data provided to PM TRASYS (see Appendix A). Most 
new users appear to seemingly stumble upon the training systems by happenstance, not 
by design. Even with a sharp decrease in the number of Marines deployed to Afghanistan, 
the operational tempo for units has not decreased enough for leaders to feel they have the 
time and space to properly crawl, walk, and run through their T&R requirements (often 
called pre-deployment training). When Marines are pressed for time, they react with 
muscle memory. This means that they rely on what they already know and the vast 
majority does not know about training systems and LVC-TE. There are three reasons for 
this.  
a. Absence from Education 
The Marine Corps does not include training systems and LVC-TE as part of its 
education focus. Though some schoolhouses do support portions of their curriculum with 
training systems, there is no structured education on the systems, their capabilities, and 
the LVC-TE concept.  
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b. Absence from Training Courses 
The Marine Corps does not train its Marines to use training systems, to use LVC-
TE, or how to incorporate them into unit training plans.  
c. Absence from T&R Standards 
The Marine Corps does not prescribe the use of training systems and LVC-TE. 
Except in the case of resource exhaustive communities like aviation, armor, assault 
amphibians, light armored reconnaissance, and motor transportation, the Marine Corps 
does not have T&R standards that prescribe the use of these capabilities. The Marine 
Corps has a propensity to let commanders decide for themselves how to achieve their 
T&R requirements. This means that those commanders and their Marines will not use 
training systems (and a LVC-TE concept) that they have not been educated on, trained to 
use, or prescribed to use. A lack of policies with regards to T&E efforts has likely stunted 
the Marine Corps’ institutional growth and recent promising LVC-TE achievements may 
be for naught without T&E being addressed from the top down. 
3. Integration  
As extensive as LVC-TE clearly is, there is no one serving as the LVC-TE 
capabilities integration officer (CIO). The capabilities developed to this point have been 
based on small groups of personnel and organizations coming together sporadically to 
achieve common LVC training objectives. There is not an individual or organization that 
is the lead for integrating LVC-TE into EF-21 or other concepts and capabilities. Figure 
13 provides a schematic that I developed in order to explain the requirements flow to PM 
TRASYS. LVC-TE is an enterprise problem but it is regularly rendered a “TECOM 
problem” and this mislabeling has left LVC-TE out of normal capability development 
and integration efforts that take place above TECOM. This has meant a lack of unity of 
command, which means there is no true unity of effort for LVC-TE integration. 
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Figure 13.  Flow of requirements to PM TRASYS 
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II. EVOLUTION OF IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEM 
A. PROJECT MANAGER—COMBINED ARMS COMMAND AND 
CONTROL TRAINING UPGRADE SYSTEM (CACCTUS) 
1. Introduction to Project Management for Training Systems 
In January 2012, while assigned to PM TRASYS, I was very unexpectedly 
assigned duties as the project manager (PJM) for CACCTUS. This was the first time that 
I had been assigned at the project level and worked directly with an integrated product 
team (IPT). While it was under unfortunate circumstances (the serious injury of a 
colleague) it was extremely important in allowing me to begin understanding the 
environment and institutional challenges for training systems and LVC-TE.  
The aspects of CACCTUS itself are not important to this paper but the lessons 
learned resonate across other training system programs and LVC-TE. One of the striking 
items that I learned early on was that there was only one other uniformed Marine directly 
involved with CACCTUS management and development. All other personnel that I dealt 
with were either government civilians or contracted civilians. This fact concerned me 
because I was not sure if I knew what Marines needed from CACCTUS if I was not able 
to directly hear from them. 
2. Developing an Integrated Plan  
I had a tremendous amount to learn after becoming a PJM and compensated for 
my acquisition shortfalls by focusing on what I knew how to do as a Marine. That meant 
identifying my mission and then developing a plan to achieve the mission. After pouring 
over a number of recent and historic documents for CACCTUS, I was able to clarify that 
my mission was to achieve full operational capability (FOC) for CACCTUS in early 
FY18 (initial operational capability had already been achieved). That meant that I had 
roughly five years to achieve FOC requirements but I did not expressly know what those 
requirements were or what order they needed to be completed in. Working primarily with 
the engineers and logistician on my IPT, we identified broadly stated hardware and 
software capabilities that we felt were needed and then we made sure that they lined up 
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with the CACCTUS CDD. This initial plan for achieving FOC is provided in Appendix 
B. We evaluated which capabilities we thought were higher priorities for training, which 
ones were needed in order to enable other capabilities, and which ones needed more time 
for technological maturity. Though not provided in this paper, we made rough order 
estimates of costs for those capabilities in order to see how they lined up with our 
planned funding in the FYDP. Following my IPT’s efforts, we presented this plan to a 
Users’ Conference with representatives (all civilians) from the five locations across the 
Marine Corps. The results of that gathering are presented in Appendix C. Some 
requirements received new prioritization, others were found to be redundant or 
unnecessary, and we learned that some requirements were be developed by other 
programs that we could wait to borrow. This collaborative process allowed us to write 
better task orders to our prime contractor, develop better training instructions, adjust 
hardware requirements, and validate or request adjustments to the FYDP—we were able 
to immediately reallocate $1 million to another program within PM TRASYS after 
looking at our immediate requirements versus funds available.  
3. Where Is My Advocate? 
While very fruitful and very educational, I remained concerned that we had 
developed this detailed and comprehensive plan without any other uniformed Marines 
present and without any other program offices or CIOs. I knew that our plan supported 
the CACCTUS CDD requirements (approved in December 2008) but how did I know if 
our plan lined up with other Marine Corps requirements and capabilities? At the time of 
our conference in August 2012, LVC-TE was not a blip on my radar as a project 
manager. Why did I not have instructions and guidance related to ensuring that the plans 
for CACCTUS were in line with future LVC-TE requirements and capabilities? Most of 
all, I asked where my advocate was. 
B. WHAT IS ADVOCACY? 
Despite written policies and processes, Marine Corps training systems have 
lacked sufficient advocacy in past years. The absence of sufficient advocacy can lead to 
misrepresentation of system requirements and inaccurate prioritization of funding 
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requirements—the total result being that Marines are not provided the training systems 
and LVC-TE capabilities that they actually need in a timely manner. Advocacy has 
become such an important element for Marine Corps business that new a Marine Corps 
Order (MCO) was developed and signed in 2013. The specified end state of this MCO is 
that “Advocates make recommendations in their areas of expertise to support well 
informed decisions. Advocates and proponents represent the Marine Corps position on 
their areas to organizations outside and inside of the Marine Corps” (CMC, 2013). There 
are quite a number of functional areas identified in the MCO but the focus is on ensuring 
that the MAGTF elements and Marine Corps warfighting functions are fully covered. The 
MCO specifically identifies the unique and broad advocacy roles that Capabilities 
Development and Integration (CD&I); Plans, Policies, and Operations (PP&O); and 
Installations and Logistics (I&L) have in the total process. Without fully reciting the 
MCO, the best way to demonstrate the totality, complexity, impact, and importance of 
advocacy is to look at how PP&O and I&L view their roles. Figure 14 is PP&O’s view on 
advocacy as specific to the GCE and Figure 15 is I&L’s advocacy concept with a focus  
 
Figure 14.  PP&O (GCE advocate) concept for advocacy (from PP&O, 2013) 
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Figure 15.  I&L (LCE advocate) concept for advocacy (from I&L, 2013)  
on the LCE. In order to address the issues that matter most, the advocates utilize 
processes that allow them to hear and present the issues, socialize them, prioritize them, 
and then present them for decisions as necessary at the appropriate levels. The following 
are a number of those processes used as necessary to support both program development 
and then advocacy (PP&O, 2013) (I&L, 2013). 
1. PROCESSES 
a. Configuration Control Boards/Integrated Product Teams 
Configuration Control Boards (CCB) and IPTs are the lowest level of the process. 
IPTs, sometimes just a few persons and sometimes dozens, are the teams that manage the 
day-to-day activities of a project. CCBs are when the IPT members, primarily leadership, 
meet with other stakeholders, primarily users and requirements officers, to identify 
changes necessary within the project to make sure it maintains the configuration required 
to support the users’ needs. At least in the case of training systems, CCBs take place at 
irregular intervals with little knowledge outside of a core group of individuals and often 
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without uniformed Marine involvement. Though labeled a Users Conference, the meeting 
in August 2012 was essentially a CCB. 
b. Working Groups and Working IPTs 
Working groups (WG) and Working IPTs (WIPT) are mid-level leadership 
meetings that can often involve O-6 and GS-15 level personnel. Their focus and purposes 
can vary widely but are generally intended to address issues across numerous programs 
or systems. 
c. Operational Advisory Groups 
Operational advisory groups (OAG) serve intermediate purposes as the forum in 
which advocates are able to fully socialize and evaluate issues as envisioned in Figures 
14 and 15. MCO 5611.6 specifically states: “OAGs provide a forum for interface 
between operating forces and Headquarters, Marine Corps and supporting establishment 
action officers. They normally serve as a vehicle for identifying and recommending 
prioritization of issues and solutions that directly impact a specific area of operational 
capability.” OAGs are additionally authorized to establish temporary IPTs or WGs as 
necessary (CMC, 2013). While attended by various personnel throughout the Marine 
Corps, OAGs typically have a core voting membership of O-5 and O-6 commanders. In 
terms of the “process,” OAGs are essential as they are the forum where issues are 
identified for further action/decision or not. 1- or 2-star general officers often receive the 
immediate output of OAGs. 
d. Boards 
Boards are the senior and highest level for advocacy. They are chaired by the 
senior advocate (normally a 3-star general officer (GO)). As an example, in the case of 
the GCE, the Ground Board is chaired by DC, PP&O. MCO 5611.3 defines the Board’s 
role as to “review emerging issues, develop top level consensus, and assist in facilitating 
engagement and necessary actions.” (CMC, 2013)  Figure 16 provides a good example of 
the process and communities involved from the OAG to Board level in the case of the 
GCE. Often, issues within each MAGTF element can be decided at the Board level but 
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those issues that have a full Marine Corps impact or cannot be handled by the resources 
within that advocate are elevated to the MROC. 
 
Figure 16.  Ground Board Process—GCE Advocate (from PP&O, 2013) 
e. MROC 
First preceded by the Marine Requirements Board, the MROC is the final stop for 
official decision making with regard to programs and most issues in the Marine Corps. 
Items like ICDs and CDDs are approved at the MROC level. The MROC is chaired by 
the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps (ACMC). Figure 17 provides a process 
flow for issues to flow to and through the MROC (CMC, 2013). 
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Figure 17.  Advocates and Proponents role in MROC Process (from CMC, 
2013) 
f. Training Systems and LVC-TE Process? 
Through examining numerous communities and programs throughout the Marine 
Corps, one would see that they follow this integrated process in order to achieve issue 
resolution and top-level guidance. They follow this process through the actions 
(coordination, planning, briefings, etc.) of the advocate action officers. In the case of 
training systems and LVC-TE, this is not the case. Though there are established IPTs, 
CCBs, WGs, WIPTs, OAGs, and Boards that training systems and LVC-TE fall under, 
there is no central action officer (i.e. CIO) to ensure that they are connected (via issues, 
personnel, organizations, funding, etc.) to form an integrated process. As such, training 
system and LVC-TE issues have gone unnoticed without proper socialization, and often 
without decision makers being involved. As I looked to identify my advocate while I was 
the CACCTUS PJM, I became very aware that the process was not working for my 
system or others. So I set about to educate myself and many others about training systems 
and LVC-TE and seek out an advocate. 
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C. ROADSHOW FOR EDUCATION AND ADVOCACY  
Appendix D provides a comprehensive list of the key briefings, meetings, and 
conferences that I attended in a little less than 18 months. Every one of these events 
provided new information and there was very much an evolution of better understanding 
the Marine Corps through this process. Though I am attempting to separate these 
activities below, the reality is that they are all interconnected and it must be understood 
that all of these events are constantly building on one another and usually have 
overlapping issues, people, and organizations. 
a. OAGs 
My first OAG interaction was with the GCE Combined OAG (COAG) in April 
2013. I had attended the Infantry OAG in a previous billet and knew what to expect as far 
as people and issues but I was not sure how I would be received coming in from the 
acquisitions community. Aside from being in acquisitions, my billet in Orlando, Florida 
with PM TRASYS meant that I rarely had daily contact with the operating forces and 
headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) action officers. When I attended the GCE COAG, I 
saw that other MCSC PMs were very involved in the meetings. This is when I realized 
that training systems and LVC-TE were not being properly presented at the OAGs 
because no one knew that they needed to talk about them. I then sought to identify which 
OAGs were appropriate venues for those topics and to request speaking opportunities. 
Those key OAGs identified were the GCE COAG, I&L T&E OAG, MAGTF Fires OAG, 
and MAGTF T&E OAG. Though I did not directly attend any OAGs that fall under the 
ACE advocate, there were often ACE action officers at the other OAGs; particularly the 
MAGTF Fires OAG.  
b. HQMC Advocates 
Though advocate action officers are at the center of organizing and running the 
OAGs, it is essential to brief them separately in order to gauge the maturity and 
relevancy of issues. I directly set up meetings and briefings in August and 
September 2013 with action officers at PP&O (POG), I&L (LPC), and CD&I 
(Fires and Maneuver Integration Division (ID), Logistics ID, MAGTF ID) in 
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order to directly ask for assistance in advocacy and opportunities to educate their 
OAG participants about training systems and LVC-TE. While I was well received 
and had good conversations, the primary message that I received back was that 
the issues that I was bringing up were “TECOM issues” and did not necessarily 
apply to them. This was frustrating yet essential to understanding the problem. If I 
wanted training systems and LVC-TE to become agenda items at OAGs, then I 
would need to convince the action officers of this. 
c. Conferences 
Outside of the advocacy process are numerous conferences. Sometimes they are 
called symposiums or other names but they are all gatherings for specific communities or 
events and they all offer additional opportunities to present issues for further socialization 
and awareness. The most important conferences that I attended, aside from those related 
to Large Scale Exercise 14 (LSE-14), were the Inspector and Instructor (I&I) Conference 
held by Marine Corps Forces Reserve and the Senior Gunners Symposium (neither event 
had published proceedings). The I&I Conference continued to confirm how uneducated 
and unaware many Marines are with regards to training systems and LVC-TE. Having 
previously attended the Gunners Symposium and having worked with Gunners (Infantry 
Weapons Officers) throughout my career, I knew the impact that their community can 
have within the Marine Corps, particularly the GCE. Through further educating them on 
training systems and LVC-TE, they later asked for direct training regarding these issues 
for their new class of Gunners. Some of the results of this training are provided in 
Chapter IV but this was a very important step in continuing to evolve my own education. 
d. Integrating the Processes 
Marines respond primarily to external pressures and, in the case of advocate 
action officers, they respond to the needs of their bosses (Colonel O-6, 1- to 3-star GOs) 
and the operating forces that they represent. The illustration of this is provided in my 
success with the Logistics community. I first met with a representative of I&L (LPC) in 
August 2013. LPC is the advocate for the Logistics community and LPC-3 specifically 
focuses on T&E. I was able to get on the agenda for their first I&L T&E OAG in 
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November 2013. While providing a well-received education to the participants, I did not 
succeed in LPC-3 recognizing the need to become the advocate for any specific training 
systems and to become more directly involved in LVC-TE. Learning my lessons from 
that experience, the other experiences, and my continuing education on LVC-TE, I was 
better prepared to present during the next I&L T&E OAG in May 2014. At the first OAG, 
I had given a PM TRAYS command brief and overview of all training systems. During 
this second OAG, I streamlined the topics to just a few systems that I felt directly 
supported the Logistics community’s T&R needs and an overview of LVC-TE. Just prior 
to the May 2014 OAG, the inputs from across the Marine Corps had just been received in 
MCATS for the LVC-TE CONOPS. Pulling from those inputs, I was able to provide 
direct demand signal statements from the four Marine Logistics Groups (one from each 
MEF and Marine Forces Reserve) in order to present at the OAG. After first explaining 
and discussing what LVC training is, I then presented a demand signal slide and opened 
up the issue for further discussion. With formal Logistics schoolhouses jumping in as 
well, the advocate was able to hear that their operating force and supporting 
establishment commanders had requirements for these capabilities and they needed 
training systems to better meet their T&R needs. It was at this time that the LPC 
advocates acknowledged that they (or someone within I&L) needed to get further 
involved. This was an essential step forward in both achieving further socialization and 
awareness of LVC-TE but in also fully realizing how to properly utilize and integrate the 
various elements of the advocacy process. This success is demonstrated in Figures 18 and 
19. The slides in those figures are from the out-brief at the May 2014 I&L T&E OAG and 
highlight the recognition of simulation and LVC-TE as issues that I&L needs to take 
further action on (I&L, 2014). 
 37
 
Figure 18.  Logistics simulation issues (from I&L, 2014) 
 
Figure 19.  LCE advocate continuing actions (from I&L, 2014) 
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D. AN UNINFORMED MARINE CORPS 
Though some gains have been made in further educating select action officers 
about LVC-TE, the results remain clear to me that the vast majority of the Marine Corps 
remain uninformed. With even the minor expectations that TECD has for how much 
LVC-TE will impact and support the Marine Corps, it is questionable how effective and 
well received the capabilities will be if Marines are not more involved in the process and 
educated and trained on how to utilize LVC-TE. Before addressing how to do that, the 
myriad potential capabilities that LVC-TE can provide need to be understood. 
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III. IDENTIFYING THE POSSIBILITIES 
After turning over my CACCTUS PJM duties in January 2013, I took on a new 
role within the Operations Section of PM TRASYS. In conjunction with this, I became 
aware in March 2013 that TECD and TECOM were moving forward on LVC-TE 
development. I volunteered to be the LVC-TE lead for PM TRASYS. Knowing that there 
were numerous gaps towards training systems development, I expected to find the same 
within LVC-TE development. I sought out all opportunities to both educate myself and 
others on about training systems and LVC-TE. I found that the only way to capture 
current and future efforts was to actively seek out those individuals and organizations that 
were specifically engaged in activities with regards to the Navy and Marine Corps. 
A. LVC-TE IS NOT A NEW CONCEPT  
The Marine Corps has been poised to dramatically move forward in LVC 
capabilities before–both in terms of concept and initial capabilities.   In the September 
2002 issue of the Marine Corps Gazette, Dr. Michael Bailey provided a realistic concept 
of training (CACCTUS and Deployable Virtual Training Environment (DVTE)) and C4I 
systems being interoperable in order better support mission rehearsal for Marines afloat 
and ashore yet, 12 years later, the Marine Corps remains unable to fully provide this 
capability (and not because of technical shortfalls) (Bailey, 2002).   
A large part of the Marine Corps’ problem with developing LVC-TE has been a 
failure to immediately follow-up and build upon past efforts. In 2005 and 2007, Marines 
in 29 Palms California were training virtually with AC-130 pilots in Hurlburt Field, 
Florida. Utilizing the joint training enterprise network, Marines conducted ground 
maneuvers in DVTE while also performing forward air controller tasks with the AC-130 
pilots that were in their simulators (AFSOC, 2005) (Coslett, 2007). Though similar 
training has been continued through events like Emerald Warrior, this training is not 
standardized and has not been a capability that the Marine Corps has institutionally 
addressed (Velazquez, 2014). Those efforts in 2005, 2007, and since were coordinated 
and executed locally. While the final objective is for LVC-TE to be readily accessible 
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and easily support units locally, the Marine Corps cannot achieve that objective when 
initial LVC efforts are being conducted separately without direct linkage to institutional 
efforts and resources. 
Despite these past disconnections, the Marine Corps is in an encouraging position 
to realize those LVC concepts that Dr. Bailey and others have introduced in the past. 
While other LVC integration and interoperability efforts have been within the spirit of 
LVC-TE, it is only recently that the Marine Corps has taken a giant step to demonstrate 
the holistic training capabilities that LVC-TE can provide–this was done through LSE-14. 
What is truly different with regards to LSE-14 is the assimilation of training systems into 
a large MAGTF exercise in which all levels for coordination and execution were 
participating and able to train in a connected environment regardless of accessing the 
training via L, V, or C systems.   
B. DEVELOPING NEW CAPABILITIES, AGAIN 
PM TRASYS heard of I MEF’s desire to integrate virtual training systems in the 
Fall of 2013 and recognized that it was an objective that the operating forces should not 
be trying to achieve alone. At the same time, the Assistant Wing Commander, 3d Marine 
Air Wing had directly reached out to Deputy Commander; Systems Engineering, 
Interoperability, Architectures and Technology (SIAT). This is when MCSC support to I 
MEF began to develop. Leveraging the right attendance of individuals at the 
Interservice/Industry Training, Simulation and Education Conference (I/ITSEC) in early 
December 2013; I MEF, PM TRASYS, Naval Air Warfare Center Training Systems 
Division (NAWCTSD), SIAT, and TECD began a partnership to improve current 
simulation interoperability capabilities. Realizing the advantage that LVC can provide his 
units for both home station training and exercises like LSE-14, CG I MEF contacted PM 
TRASYS that same week of I/ITSEC to officially ask for support in conduct of a proof of 
concept (PoC) in late January 2014 (see Figure 20). The concept was a success with all 
four goals (bottom-left corner of Figure 20) being achieved. It was during the 
development of the PoC that Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity 
(MCTSSA) became fully involved as well. Shortly after the PoC, an LVC WG met in 
Orlando, Florida in order to develop a supportable simulation capability for inclusion into 
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Figure 20.  Operational View for I MEF LVC Proof of Concept. (from I 
MEF, 2014) 
LSE-14. At this stage, the LSE-14 Concept Development Conference and Initial Planning 
Conference (IPC) had already been conducted, so there was limited opportunity to get a 
complete LVC concept included into LSE-14. Working in a very short amount of time 
with a large number of PM TRASYS and NAWCTSD engineers, a technically 
supportable simulation capability was developed that would allow for unclassified virtual 
simulators to simultaneously interact while sending “tracks” to the classified common 
operating picture (COP) (see Figure 21). This capability was briefed at the LSE-14 Mid-
Planning Conference (MPC) in February 2014 and was accepted under the condition that 
it would “do no harm” to the exercise network and would not interfere with the primary 
training audience (1st MEB, 2014). In the ensuing months, the numerous stakeholders 
(see Figure 22) continued frequent collaboration that included on-site laboratory 
integration in Orlando in June 2014. In addition, I MEF worked closely with 
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Figure 21.  LSE-14 LVC Integration Concept (NAWCTSD, 2014) 
 
Figure 22.  LSE-14 Stakeholders for LVC (from Author, 2014) 
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NAWCTSD and the Deputy Commandant for Aviation (APW-71) to integrate the 
Aviation Distributed Virtual Training Environment (ADVTE) into the classified network 
for LSE-14. 
C. LVC-TE CURRENT CAPABILITIES 
The Marine Corps’ most robust set of current capabilities were demonstrated 
during LSE-14 in August 2014. Though the LVC-TE efforts were limited in scope 
compared to the size of the overall exercise, virtual integration did support MAGTF 
training by linking individual training up to the MEB staff’s training. Utilizing LVC, 1st 
MEB executed LSE-14 with more than 3,700 live Marines and Sailors while the other 
members of the 15,000-person MAGTF were simulated virtually and constructively 
(Kovach, 2014). The 5th Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (CMBG) additionally 
participated as an adjacent unit to 1st MEB.  5th CMBG’s roughly 100 personnel 
provided a live combat operations center (COC) while the rest of their forces were 
constructive (Mundy, 2014). Whether coming from immersive trainers (e.g., aviation 
training systems (ATS), SAVT), computer based trainers (e.g. DVTE, MAGTF Tactical 
Warfare Simulation (MTWS)), or C4I systems (e.g. Command and Control Personal 
Computer (C2PC), Blue Force Tracker (BFT), AN/TPS-59 radar), the MEB and its 
MSCs were able to simultaneously track the locations of all participants via their top 
COP and communicated up, down, and laterally across the organization. 
1. Overview of Large Scale Exercise-14 (LSE-14)  
LSE-14 was an assessed MAGTF exercise at the MEB level composed of all four 
elements of the MAGTF. The CE was 1st MEB, GCE was Regimental Landing Team-7 
(RLT-7), ACE was Marine Air Group-16 (MAG-16), and LCE was Combat Logistics 
Regiment-1 (CLR-1). The live maneuver elements and combat operation centers (COC) 
were located at the Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center (MCAGCC) at 29 Palms, 
California but LSE-14 was conducted in a distributed and near simultaneous manner 
across several installations which also included Marine Corps Base Quantico, Nellis Air 
Force Base (AFB), Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Yuma, MCAS Miramar, and 
MCAS Camp Pendleton), which demonstrates the MAGTF’s core capabilities within a 
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joint and combined operating environment with appropriate exercise control and training. 
Figure 23 provides a view of the MEB table of organization for LSE-14 (live elements 
are in “blue” and constructive are in “gold”). Though many of the units were “live,” they 
may have only been represented in the training area by a COC and key personnel (e.g., 
fire support coordination centers and fire support teams); this is why a 15,000-person 
MEB was in reality only upwards of 4,000 actual participants. The Air Force was 
integrated as well with the Combined Air Operations Center at Nellis AFB. MAGTF 
Training Command (MAGTFTC) was the overall Exercise Lead for LSE-14 with 
MAGTF Staff Training Program (MSTP) providing Exercise Control. 1st MEB and 5th 
CMBG reported to Combined Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC); the 
CFLCC was located in Quantico, Virginia at MSTP facilities. 
 
Figure 23.  1st MEB Task Organization for LSE-14 (from 1st MEB, 2014) 
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2. Why Was LVC Needed for LSE-14?  
LVC was needed for LSE-14 due to the constrained training areas and ranges 
aboard MCAGCC, limited resources to represent complete elements of the MAGTF 
(manpower and equipment), and budget constraints. In order to properly train the MEB 
commander and staff, the MEB needs the ability to have all of the forces required for the 
operation and to be able to operate in a large enough area to maneuver these forces. LVC 
provides the solution to these problems and was thus the enabler for LSE-14. Whether 
forces are live in the field or represented in a training system, LVC provides the ability 
for all units and events to be broadcast to the MEB’s COP regardless of the originating 
source. I MEF’s goal was to ensure that 1st MEB received the best training possible—
that equated to maximizing the number of Marines trained and improving the training for 
Marines. Each type of training (live, virtual, or constructive) has its pros and cons—when 
properly integrated together (i.e. LVC), the gaps (or cons) in one type of training can 
often be mitigated by one or both of the others. 
3. LVC Concept in Support of LSE-14 
The best way to show the effect of LVC in support of LSE-14 is to look at the execution 
of the MEB’s operations plan. The final exercise (FINEX) took place from 8–14 August. 
Actions on 8 August were constructive—this means that all units were represented via 
the training systems while the live forces physically finished moving into their starting 
positions prior to 9 August. Live training initiated on 9 August and the MEB’s planned 
scheme of maneuver for that training is shown in Figure 24. As the live forces attacked to 
destroy MEB objectives A and B, there were subordinate (e.g. 2d Battalion, 4th Marines; 
1st Tank Battalion) and adjacent units (e.g. 5th CMBG) that could not be live and were 
thus represented constructively. RLT-7 accomplished the mission of destroying MEB 
objectives A and B by the end of 10 August (a day ahead of schedule) and the live forces 
quite literally ran out of available maneuver space (i.e., the northern limits of MCAGCC). 
In order to continue the mission to interdict MEB objectives C and D (see Figure 25), the 
continuation of the exercise had to be accomplished constructively as there are no 
geographic limitations within MTWS. The use of constructive simulation for large  
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Figure 24.  1st MEB plan during live phase of LSE-14 (from 1st MEB, 2014) 
 
Figure 25.  1st MEB plan during constructive phase of LSE-14 (from 1st 
MEB, 2014) 
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MAGTF exercises is nothing new for the Marine Corps, however, what is new is the 
desire to replace some of the live or constructive events with virtual simulation. 
4. LSE-14 LVC Results  
One of the primary goals of the PoC in January 2014 was to validate that virtual 
systems could be integrated and feed “tracks” into the MEB’s COP. That same primary 
goal was achieved for LSE-14. The connectivity as shown in Figure 26 was achieved 
during the “warm start” period of training for the MEB staff from 4–7 August. Though 
the final execution phase of LSE-14 was held from 8–14 August, a staff progression 
period, called a warm start, was the primary window utilized for assessing the 
connectivity and capability.   
 
Figure 26.  LSE-14 final OV-1 for LVC integration.  (from MCAGCC, 2014) 
 48
Though there were some technical difficulties in the form of voice 
communication problems via radio, and virtual trainers “crashing” due to high entity 
counts or improper configurations for gateway traffic, success was achieved per objective 
goals—Marines were put into the training systems, placed into their roles (e.g. Joint 
Tactical Air Controller (JTAC), pilot, convoy commander, vehicle driver, etc.) with 
simulated equipment, and they conducted assigned missions while coordinating with 
Marines in other locations. These training missions were conducted while simultaneously 
allowing the MEB, MSC COCs (i.e. RLT-7, MAG-16, CLR-1), and Exercise Control to 
maintain situational awareness of their activities and status. This was achieved through 
using systems on the unclassified side (SAVT, DVTE Virtual Battle Space 2 (VBS2), 
CACCTUS, Combat Convoy Simulator (CCS), and AH-1W Aircrew Procedures Trainer) 
and on the classified side (MTWS, ADVTE, DVTE (VBS2)). 
The reason that the LSE-14 effort stands out against any other past or recent LVC 
efforts within the Marine Corps is because the full MAGTF was involved and trained 
from the individual level to the MEB staff. Often when training systems are used, certain 
elements/roles are played by contractors, are automated, or are completely excluded in 
order to simplify the training, reduce costs, or because it was not planned for. While 
contractors did support many elements of LSE-14 (primarily exercise control and 
constructive simulation), none of the 1st MEB units were excluded from the exercise–all 
MAGTF elements and subordinate units had to interact in order to achieve even 
individual training objectives. This example is best made with the case of JTACs. 
When JTACs normally train via systems like DVTE and SAVT, a contractor or 
another Marine is playing the role of pilot while sitting at another terminal usually just 
feet away and there is no one playing the role of fire support coordinator or air space 
coordinator. While this set up may still provide a basic level of training for the JTAC, it 
is not realistic with regards to how things work during actual operations. The JTACs 
training via DVTE or SAVT during LSE-14 not only had real pilots on the other end who 
were flying missions in their own ATS hundreds of miles away but that JTAC had to put 
in a proper request for support to the direct air support center (DASC) and then wait for 
the DASC to properly hand the pilot off to the JTAC for execution of the mission. While 
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this obviously adds in additional opportunities for communication and coordination 
problems that can slow the training down and make it frustrating, it is these same 
problems that make the training that much more realistic and effective for the participants 
(including the MEB commander and staff). 
The other piece lacking in the past is that previous events were done in a bubble 
with very limited visibility by senior leadership and there was usually no continued 
momentum. With visits from the ACMC and other influential 2- and 3-star GOs, LSE-14 
allowed the LVC-TE concept and capability to gain visibility across a broad range of 
senior leadership. While this is encouraging, LVC-TE will still require a demand signal 
(or at least continued interest) from their level for continued momentum. 
D. FUTURE CAPABILITIES 
While serving as the PJM for CACCTUS, I certainly had objectives to take 
advantage of new technology but it was not until I became involved with LVC-TE that I 
learned about the many organizations and projects within the science and technology 
(S&T) community. As shown previously in Figure 4, the Office of Naval Research 
(ONR) is the technology developer for the Marine Corps. Within ONR, Code 30 
(Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare & Combating Terrorism) is the division that is 
supporting training systems. With respect to training systems, ONR (Code 30), TECD, 
and PM TRASYS conduct a monthly coordination meeting called the Three Circle 
Meeting. On a larger scale, the Marine Corps has begun holding a regular S&T focused 
OAG that is titled the Operating Force Science, Technology and Experimentation 
(OST&E) OAG. As I became more aware of S&T initiatives, I also became familiar with 
projects within the Army Research Lab (the Army’s equivalent to ONR). For the Army’s 
training systems, the Simulation and Training Technology Center (STTC) provides much 
of that support. While there are many projects and technologies being developed by these 
organizations, there are a few projects that offer substantial capabilities to support LVC-
TE in the future. 
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1. Office of Naval Research (Code 30) 
a. Augmented Immersive Team Training (AITT) 
AITT is a technology nearing the point of maturity to be transitioned from ONR 
to PM TRASYS for the purpose of support two system-of-systems projects, Force-on-
Force (FoF) and Squad Immersive Training Environment (SITE). FoF focuses more on 
providing instrumented training systems that support live training while SITE is focusing 
on providing an LVC capability focused at the squad level. AITT provides a capability to 
allow the users to utilize augmented reality binoculars the same as they would use a set of 
Vector21B binoculars in order to see and engage targets on the battlefield for close air 
support or call for fire. In normal live training, the JTAC and forward observer need real 
targets, real supporting platforms (i.e., aircraft, artillery, mortars), and real ammunition in 
order to fully execute the T&R standards. Through the augmented reality binoculars and 
through interoperability with FoF and SITE, any or all of those real supporting elements 
can be provided instead through augmented reality (ONR, 2014). This training capability 
not only can potential provide the same fidelity of training as fully live training but at a 
significantly reduced cost and, if not using real ammunition at all, not restricted to 
designated training ranges and areas. 
b. Decision Making and Learning 
With distributed operations at squad and platoon levels starting to become more 
normal, and with the complexity of the knowledge-base (particular for local culture) 
needed for these operations, the ability to improve how small unit leaders learn and make 
decisions is becoming a higher priority. The ability to measure how well an individual 
learns and their decisions making skills is also a gap that needs to be tackled. Numerous 
projects like Accelerating Development of Small Unit Decision Making and Perceptual 
Training Systems are under research and development their results will support improved 
training methodologies and materiel solutions to support LVC-TE (ONR, 2013).  
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2. Army Research Lab (STTC) 
a. Augmented REality Sandtable (ARES) 
ARES may very well prove to be the invasive and necessary technological 
capability for future military training and operations. The simple concept is to take 
commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment (projector, flat screen monitor, laptop, and 
Microsoft Kinect; all roughly $1500) and display terrain, units, coordination measures, 
weather effects, etc., onto contoured sand in sandtable. In the current ARES proof-of-
concept, “the Kinect senses user gestures, changes to the sand “terrain,” and potentially, 
verbal commands as forms of user interaction. ARES projects moving military units, 
terrain features, and other data onto the sand” (ARL, 2014) (Hedelt, 2014). Figure 27 
provides an overview of this basic concept. 
 
Figure 27.  ARES basic concept (from ARL, 2014) 
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While ARES sounds very simple, and perhaps mundane, the possibilities are 
anything but that. This concept is one of those where one really needs to see it first hand 
in order to grasp the potential functionality. Targeted functionalities include (ARL, 
2014): 
 Improved battlespace visualization. 
 Decreased time to author 3D terrains and scenarios. 
 Increased student engagement / retention levels. 
 Joint/Coalition Wargaming and Mission Planning through networked 
ARES tables. 
The sandtable offers a blank canvas that can be contoured to meet the terrain 
variations of a map, satellite image, Google earth view, or any other picture that the user 
needs to see in order to support planning and discussions. Once the user starts to layer in 
displays of units and personnel, or key infrastructure, or communication analyses results, 
or any other planning factor that is needed, and the visual capabilities to support 
collaborative planning should be predictable. Add in the live feeds of forces training via 
any means of L-V-C and the opportunity for commanders to discuss new options or for 
entry-level students to fully grasp what an instructor was talking about will be 
indispensable. Like LVC-TE, the ARES concept and capability will only be limited to the 
imaginations of its users. 
b. Distributed Soldier Representation (DSR) 
One of the foundational M&S issues that DSR is trying to address is that “the 
Soldier, as a complex human, is not sufficiently represented in models and simulations.”  
When individuals train by controlling virtual Soldiers and Marines, those avatars often 
come across as super humans that need little sleep, food, or water and can run long 
distances with heavy weight. While simulation developers are adding more realism in 
order to reduce the opportunity for super humans to exist, there remains a long-term 
objective to make this type of training experience as realistic as possible for the user. 
DSR’s focuses are: 
 Investigate those factors that affect Soldier effectiveness 
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 Identify where there are gaps in modeling those factors in current Soldier 
representations 
 Offer a service oriented, distributed M&S environment able to assist in 
filling those gaps 
“The DSR long range plan is to provide a capability to represent those human 
aspects that affect Soldier performance with greater fidelity and an increased realism in 
the representation of the Soldier within simulations.”  To achieve any of these objectives, 
the DSR team is looking at myriad factors that affect an individual’s performance on the 
battlefield:  cognition, morale, resilience, human physiology, human psychology, unit 
cohesion, stress, unit as a complex adaptive system, leadership, decision science, and 
effects of the Soldier as a family member. Efforts through DSR should not only produce 
more realistic virtual training for users but could support the development of personal 
avatars for each user (Diego, 2014). 
c. Rapid Unified Generation of Urban Databases (RUGUD) 
RUGUD is intended to allow users to generate their own high-fidelity urban 
environments. With terrain databases often being the limiting factor in a simulation 
system, this capability can be a critical benefit, particularly towards supporting mission 
rehearsals while deployed. RUGUD will support this gap by enabling “rapid generation 
of realistic, geospecific Synthetic Environments for tactical operations” (ARA, 2014). 
Current RUGUD efforts are focused on (ARA, 2014): 
 Flexible-integrate COTS/government off-the-shelf software 
 Open-use open standards and formats 
 Automated-rapid production of usable datasets 
 Accurate-construct geospecific urban terrain databases 
 Consistent-produce correlated databases for disparate systems Complete 
include attribution for visuals, SAF, maps, etc. 
 Detailed-realistic urban representations include interiors, subterranean 
features, urban clutter, furniture, etc. 
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Most current training systems require an external source and/or weeks to months 
of time in order to generate new 3D terrain databases. This process does not support the 
reality of military operations in which unexpected AOs or new intelligence about an AO 
requires immediate changes for a simulator to be of use to support exercises, missions 
rehearsals, or wargaming. This is one of the many reasons why constructive simulation is 
so heavily relied on at the GO level and virtual systems are relegated for small unit and 
tactical training. RUGUD’s capabilities can significantly improve LVC-TE capabilities in 
order to allow it to better support all spectrums of T&R.  
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IV. RECOMMENDED SOLUTIONS 
Though there is an active demand signal for LVC-TE in the Marine Corps and 
though there are programmatic efforts (i.e. CDD development) underway, there remains a 
lack of a bold and far-reaching vision and any strategy or codified process in order to 
achieve near-term and long-term objectives with proper integration across the Marine 
Corps. The Marine Corps needs to define its vision, develop its strategy, educate 
Marines, get active POCs, and then synchronize efforts. The following are my 
recommendations for accomplishing this. 
A. VISION 
The LVC-TE ICD, CONOPS, and vision products from TECD provide many 
elements of the LVC-TE concept in general terms and do demonstrate the complexity and 
vastness of LVC-TE, however, a bold and far reaching vision of capabilities is still 
needed for the Marine Corps. Most people still do not understand or grasp that LVC-TE 
is not just a concept for integrating or allowing interoperability between training systems 
(this includes instrumentation and targets for live training along with virtual and 
constructive simulations). LVC-TE will allow all systems (C4I and training) to 
interoperate and will support not just training and education but also mission rehearsals 
and potentially mission execution as well. The total effort necessary to fully put this 
capability in place will require inclusion of most (if not all) HQMC organizations. Most 
of those organizations are currently unaware of LVC-TE as most are uninterested in 
learning about a program or concept that they do not think matters to them. With a 
properly formed vision (as with the EF-21 Capstone Concept), those organizations will 
see the impact on them and be able to start aligning their planning and operations in 
accordance. Many parts of the LVC-TE vision may sound like science fiction now but the 
technological gains in the next 20 years will dwarf those of the past two decades—the 
Marine Corps’ vision must be bold so that it is are poised to incorporate those future 
capabilities that may seem impossible now.  
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The following is a prioritized list of elements that the LVC-TE vision should 
address. Most important are the foundational elements and infrastructure that LVC-TE 
will need to work off of for years to come. Second in importance are those persistent 
capabilities that will make LVC-TE available throughout the Marine Corps at a more 
reduced cost and flexible to meet commander’s desires. Last, but not unimportant, are 
those enabling capabilities that will allow LVC-TE to provide a superior training 
experience that cannot be replicated elsewhere. 
1. Standards and Policy 
The only thing that seems certain right now is that LVC-TE will provide the 
standards and policies that Marine Corps systems and organizations must follow in order 
to enable LVC. Those standards and policy will have to be mandated and adjudicated in a 
manner that makes them measurable and allows organizations and program offices to be 
held accountable. These standards and policy cannot be written in a Marine Corps 
vacuum though; they must be developed with cognizance of standards being adopted and 
used by the other military services as well as internationally. Failure to do so will prevent 
the Marine Corps from properly training and rehearsing in the joint and coalition 
environments that MAGTFs are expected to be ready for. 
2. Facilities  
The Marine Corps currently utilizes numerous facilities across the Marine Corps 
in order to support training system use. Some facilities are permanent and others were 
built to be temporary. Many facilities were built with other original missions in mind and 
they have been re-purposed. There are some installations with military construction plans 
to build new facilities specifically for consolidating many of the current training systems. 
These plans have been developed though without a full LVC-TE vision and certainly 
without a strategy in order to ensure that these facilities will meet LVC-TE requirements 
in the future or even just when they are finally completed in coming years. Facility 
planning must be fully incorporated into any LVC-TE development process in order to 
ensure that a proper infrastructure is in place to support LVC-TE now and is flexible for 
the coming decades. 
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3. Networks 
There is not an expectation that a new network will be needed for LVC-TE but 
rather that multiple networks will be utilized depending on which systems are being used 
and the purpose of LVC use. LVC-TE may require enhancements to those networks or 
vice versa. The LVC-TE CONOPS does a good job of identifying the robust network 
requirements and concerns. 
4. Information Assurance 
As defined by Joint Pub 3–12, IA is actions that protect and defend information 
systems by ensuring availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and 
nonrepudiation. Training systems are not necessarily information systems but they are 
often treated that way since they have many of the same components. With the necessity 
for LVC-TE to further connect training systems with C4I (information) systems, IA is a 
very important issue that must be thoroughly planned for. LVC-TE should strive to 
reduce IA risks and simplify the approval process for systems, which are currently 
hardware centric, to become nothing more than software applications. Though this will 
not eliminate IA requirements; it will improve the process. The Marine Corps needs 
classified systems in order to support service-level and joint, interagency, 
intergovernmental and multinational (JIIM) training exercises and mission rehearsals. 
The Marine Corps also needs unclassified systems in order to provide accessibility to 
junior Marines and small units. The costly solution will be to make systems in both 
classified and unclassified versions, whether housed in the same facilities or separately. 
That will not be an acceptable solution and so the Marine Corps will need the capability 
for all systems to be interoperable through a cross-domain solution. The training and 
mission rehearsal spectrum of LVC-TE should be the leading demand signal to generate 
new policies and materiel solutions for cross-domain interoperability—current methods 
are inflexible, costly, and time consuming.  
5. Distributed 
The Marine Corps already has distributed capability for MTWS and is developing 
capabilities for other systems but the current objective for distributed operations is 
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limited to select facilities at the largest Marine Corps bases and stations. Marine Corps 
objectives need to include Marine Corps Reserve facilities down to the individual I&I 
staff level. Reserve units and I&I staff are spread across more than 140 sites in 42 states 
and the District of Columbia (MFR, 2014). Units must currently converge on the same 
locations in order to conduct training. The time and cost savings will be significant if 
much of this training can be enabled by LVC-TE. LVC-TE will be a significant leap in 
training capacity for reserve forces but not unless they are part of the total vision. 
6. Virtualization 
 Virtualization in this case is the act of taking current hardware or software that is 
meant to “stand-alone” and converting it into a format so that it can be used across 
multiple sets of hardware or housed on the same hardware with numerous other 
applications. Virtualization is a significant manner in which to reduce costs and, if 
applied correctly, can also provide a much more flexible training capability for Marines. 
IA, the Cloud, and virtualization (for both C4I and training systems) are all 
interconnected towards supporting Marine Corps goals for reduced costs, reduced 
hardware footprints, and accessibility. 
7. Terrain Databases 
Terrain databases have been a critical vulnerability for training systems for years 
now. I saw it first-hand while PJM for CACCTUS and only saw how wide spread the 
issue was after taking on the LVC-TE role. Few Marine Corps training systems share the 
same terrain database software generators and fewer share the same database locations—
this means that many of the systems are limited in their value as stand-alone systems and 
it is very difficult to achieve interoperability without months of lead time for developing 
new databases. The aviation community (via NAWCTSD) is developing the Marine 
Corps Common Visual Database for aviation simulators and the Marine Corps should 
look to use that same database as a means for achieving interoperability (i.e., seamless 
terrain correlation) across all other training systems (TECD, 2014). As mentioned in the 
S&T portion earlier, there are a number of potential applications being developed that 
will allow users to immediately import, manipulate, or develop their own terrain 
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databases. The long-term objective is to achieve both a worldwide terrain database and an 
immediate database generation capability so that the latest information from intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance assets gives Marines the most recent updates on target 
areas for mission rehearsals. 
8. Shipboard 
There are some amphibious transport dock (LPD) variant ships that have been 
designed with dedicated spaces for the ISMT but that is the limit of training system 
inclusion right now. DVTE suites and some Combat Vehicle Training Systems (CVTS) 
versions are deployable but ships are not specifically designed to support them. 
Amphibious ships (and potentially Maritime Prepositioning Force ships) need to be built 
and retro-fitted to support current and future LVC-TE systems in order to support training 
and mission rehearsal while afloat. This shipboard capability can be better supported as 
well with improved virtualization and modular components. Beyond simply giving 
Marines an improved training and rehearsal capability for themselves while afloat, the 
proper integration of C4I and training systems on ships will support improved training 
integration with the Navy, particularly in the cases of MEUs and Amphibious Ready 
Groups. The Navy has a very extensive yet intricate shipbuilding and retrofitting plan that 
the Marine Corps can utilize, but not without having LVC-TE requirements identified 
and prioritized against this plan. 
9. Collaborative Planning 
The Marine Corps uses two methods for planning–the Marine Corps planning 
process (MCPP) and rapid response planning process (R2P2). MCPP is a deliberate 
process that can be extended over a long period of time while R2P2 is a process primarily 
utilized by MEUs in order to achieve the start of mission execution within six hours of 
receiving the mission task. Both MCPP and R2P2 rely heavily on collaborative planning 
between internal staff members and external staff and agencies. The speed at which 
collaborative planning can take place is often dependent on communications and 
information flow. Through applications like ARES, LVC-TE will provide an exponential 
increase to collaborative planning processes by allowing shared visuals from the small 
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unit level up to Marine Corps operational and strategic planners and leaders. Whether 
applied to support intelligence preparation of the battlefield, course of action (COA) 
design, COA wargaming, staff estimates, confirmation briefs, or myriad other steps in 
planning, LVC-TE will provide significant efficiencies. 
10. The Cloud 
The concept of all information and applications being available concurrently to all 
users is substantial. The ability to make LVC-TE accessible to individual Marines 
globally, while reducing hardware requirements, will require use of the Cloud. 
11. After Action Reviews (AAR) 
Training systems are already providing significant enhancements to AARs 
through the Tactical Video Capture System for live training and separate AAR 
capabilities in virtual and constructive systems. The problem being created is that there is 
too much information to provide back to Marines and commanders. The Marine Corps 
needs to fuse AAR capabilities across LVC-TE systems so that they are all compatible 
and then provide functionality so that commanders and instructors can immediately tag 
critical events and incidents in order to reduce the information overload at the end of 
training. Improved AAR capabilities will also support actual operations in order to 
provide feedback at the end of missions in order to provide immediate information to 
intelligence and logistics systems, provide three-dimensional (3D) visuals of actions 
taken in synchronization with voice communications, and myriad other possibilities. 
Commanders down to the platoon level should be able to provide virtual in-briefs to 
deploying units prior to reliefs-in-place in order to give them a flyover of the AO and 
focus on key leaders and prior engagements through the use of virtual video playback of 
those events. Whether to provide a more comprehensive but user friendly turnover to 
incoming units, an intelligence update to the next unit going out, a report to an 
investigating officer, or to update targeting boards, the AAR fusion of LVC-TE systems 
will be a significant operational enhancement. 
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12. Safety 
Virtual simulation (particularly in respect to aviation simulators) has always had a 
distinct capability to allow Marines to perform dangerous tasks within the simulators that 
are too dangerous to do during live training. Key advances like the position location 
information capability for individual Marines using the Instrumented Tactical 
Engagement Simulation System II have already allowed some training events (i.e., night 
land navigation) to become safer (e.g., improved control and situational awareness for 
instructors). The same improvements for live-fire and maneuver training can be made in 
which commanders and staff know where every Marine is and can replay actions as 
necessary for AARs, investigations, etc. It is only a matter of time until the same 
capabilities can be introduced into operations in order to reduce fratricide and missing 
personnel and equipment. 
13. Marine Corps Training Information Management System (MCTIMS) 
MCTIMS is a web-based application that allows the Marine Corps to manage 
training information and is a repository for T&R standards (defined as task, condition, 
measurable standard) and formal courses of instruction. Three enhancements need to be 
made to MCTIMS for LVC-TE.  
a. Linkage to T&R Events 
The first enhancement is the ability for any user to pick from a list of training 
systems and be told what T&R events can be conducted or augmented by that system. 
Linking training systems to supported T&R events is already an on-going process but 
requires firm supervision and management for holistic success. Users currently cannot 
find which training systems support which T&R events without individually looking 
through each individual T&R event via MCTIMS or searching with the right “key words” 
in a Word or .pdf version of the T&R manual. There needs to be a more direct method for 
finding which T&R events a training system can support and vice versa.  
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b. Linkage to Training Systems 
The second enhancement is for training systems to be linked to MCTIMS so that 
when a T&R event is completed in the training system, then a report is sent to MCTIMS 
that logs the training for that individual or unit. Through proper cross-domain 
capabilities, this could then feed into a unit’s Defense Readiness Reporting System report 
in order to support more accurate status on unit readiness.  
c. Individual Avatars 
The third enhancement is the creation of individual avatars for every Marine. 
When someone virtually trains with an avatar in systems like VBS2, it is a generic 
individual that they are controlling. Creating an avatar for each individual Marine that is 
built to look like the Marine and have the same skills as the Marine, will continue to add 
more realism to virtual training and make it that much more effective. With MCTIMS 
serving as the central repository for every Marine’s completion of training (i.e., formal 
courses, physical training scores, annual training, etc.) along with their personal attributes 
(i.e., height, weight, body type, ethnicity, hair color, etc.), each Marine can have an avatar 
that is them. Individual avatars will also support future war gaming actions. The same as 
Framework for Assessing Cost and Technology (Ender, et al., 2012) allows for the 
individual components of a system to be separately evaluated in order to see what the 
expected performance and cost outcomes would be depending on the physical properties 
of those individual components, the incorporation of individual avatars (based on known 
skills and attributes) will allow the Marine Corps to better predict mission outcomes.  
14. Reducing Contractor Support 
The program funding for PM TRASYS, as shown in Figure 12, is broken down 
into mission and customer funds. Mission funds typically means those research and 
development and procurement funds with which program offices actually develop and 
purchase systems. The customer funds are then primarily those operations and 
maintenance (O&M) funds that are used to sustain the services necessary to keep systems 
available for use each year. For Marine Corps training systems, these O&M funds are 
often paying for contractors to operate, maintain, and sustain the systems. As the split in 
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Figure 12 shows, a large aspect of training system cost is going towards contractor 
support. The need for contractors to support daily operations is cost prohibitive and needs 
to be minimized (if not eliminated). Through a combination of improved user interfaces, 
training and education in schoolhouses, AI, AAR tools, etc., the Marine Corps needs to 
continually reduce the contractor footprint needed to support LVC-TE. 
15. Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational 
The expectation for joint and coalition interoperability is fairly well understood 
and will be as capable as the Marine Corps is willing to abide by the same system 
standards and policies; joint mission essential tasks should be a driving element for this 
issue. Civilian organizations are also using simulations and LVC more and a proper 
vision and strategy will allow the Marine Corps to not only conduct warfighting functions 
in LVC-TE joint and coalition units but also link-in for humanitarian assistance/disaster 
relief training and mission rehearsals with non-governmental organizations, and local, 
state, and national governments. The decision that the Marine Corps needs to make is 
whether or not it will be a leader in establishing JIIM capabilities (strategy and policy are 
at the core) or will just act as a recipient.  
16. Persistent Virtual Marine Corps World 
The tactical level is often easy to replicate during training–primarily through live 
training. The strategic level is often fairly easy to replicate as well–primarily through 
constructive training and wargaming. It is the operational level that is difficult to replicate 
because most training is short in duration (hours, days, and occasionally weeks) but the 
operational level of training requires the service to replicate longer periods of time 
(weeks to months normally), most notably in the lead up to the training. This operational 
level training gap is particularly applicable to logistics training as those elements are 
rarely stressed beyond the tactical level during training. Attempts to conduct operational 
level logistics training sometimes includes making artificial or temporary changes within 
an actual logistics system in order to go through the actions of requesting parts, supplies, 
etc., but can have an adverse effect on actual Marine Corps daily operations if not 
properly coordinated and supervised. With a persistent virtual world, the Marine Corps 
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can have a separate but mirrored environment in which operational actions can take place 
weeks or months in advance of training so that the logistics training audience is already 
being stressed at the start of the training and their actions have made an impact (positive 
and negative) on the readiness of LVC forces at the start of the training. 
17. Plug-in and Wireless Concepts 
LVC-TE must not be a difficult capability for commanders to access; it must be 
accessible to commanders and their units globally. Remembering that LSEs and MAGTF 
training is only one element of the LVC-TE capability, the Marine Corps needs to ensure 
accessibility to individuals and small units. Many current facility plans call for co-
locating all or most training systems at a base. This may be a good course of action at 
locations like 29 Palms, Hawaii, and Quantico (smaller installations with most personnel 
and units centrally located) but will likely not be conducive to the numerous units at 
locations like Camp Lejeune, Camp Pendleton, and Okinawa (large installation areas 
with personnel and units spread throughout). Commanders want their Marines to be able 
to plug-in for training in their barracks and command posts. Decisions will have to be 
made on which systems this would apply to but this needs to be a primary objective for 
enhancing T&E at many formal schoolhouses (TBS, 2013). As IA, virtualization, and 
Cloud concept and capabilities our matured, they need to be done so with wireless 
connectivity in mind for all Marines to join the LVC-TE network(s).  
18. Enabler for training, education, mission rehearsal, and maybe even 
mission execution 
The training application seems fairly straight forward for LVC-TE as that appears 
to be the primary focus right now. The education application still needs to grow with 
LVC-TE systems being utilized to support instruction within Education Command 
(EdCom) courses. The fusing of the training and education application will take place 
when EdCom students are able to watch and discuss the conduct of training in real-time 
(or in playback). An entire Expeditionary Warfare School class will be able to sit around 
a virtual sand table the size of a basketball court and watch the LVC execution of an LSE 
as the individual Marines and vehicles (regardless of them being live, virtual, or 
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constructive entities) are projected onto that virtual sand table and the class can hear real-
time radio traffic and see information flow in chat windows. The mission rehearsal 
capability will most notably support EF-21 by allowing entry forces to provide live 
intelligence information that allows afloat and land-based deploying forces to rehearse in 
virtual and constructive simulations. The key enabler for mission rehearsals is not just the 
linkage of all Marines and units that will conduct the mission but the ability for it to be 
done in the appropriate required terrain and environment (both virtually and live (pending 
permissibility); constructive is already available worldwide). The bold vision is that 
LVC-TE will one day provide the “Ender’s Game” warfighting capability. At the end of 
Ender’s Game (Card, 1985), Ender virtually sees and controls the composited Earth force 
that is attacking the alien enemy force. With the increasing use of unmanned systems, it 
is not too far-fetched to suggest that the Marine Corps can conduct future operations from 
afar with commanders and operators virtually employing unmanned systems as a 
composited force. 
19. Dismounted Virtual Immersion 
Virtual immersion for vehicle and aircraft crews is available today because the 
tasks for those personnel allow them to remain rather stationary inside a replicated 
vehicle cab, aircraft cabin/cockpit, etc., while surrounding screens and mechanical 
motions can provide the realism of movement and stimulation of senses. These platforms 
are also often the most expensive to operate and the most expensive to replace in cases of 
mishaps, so the return on investment in high fidelity simulation has allowed better 
capabilities to be produced and sustained. The Marine Corps is an infantry centric 
organization though and this means that most of its personnel conduct operations while 
dismounted and walking around on terrain. Providing virtual immersion for this type of 
training is much more difficult given the desire for the individuals to be able to walk for 
extensive distances in varying terrain. The only current capability for individual Marines 
to participate virtually on foot is through DVTE (VBS2). This means that they are 
pressing keys or moving a joystick in order to move around the battlefield. This limits the 
realism of the training as well as the number of personnel that can be involved in the 
training at one time. This still leads many Marines to think of systems like DVTE to be a 
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game and not real training. The Marine Corps needs to achieve a capability for individual 
Marines to train on foot virtually with their tactical equipment while actually walking and 
running through virtually immersive simulation. 
20. Augmented Reality 
An easy way to grasp a key concept of augmented reality is to think of the Jedi 
Council meetings in Star Wars movies where real people are able to directly interact with 
computer generated and projected individuals (holograms). Augmented reality is going to 
provide the Marine Corps with the capability for live Marines to train alongside virtual 
Marines in a manner in which they can both see and interact with one another and the 
environment that they are operating in. Augmented reality will include the ability for 
Marines to simultaneously engage live and virtual targets. As mentioned earlier, one of 
the shortfalls of live training on ranges is that it is often predictable. This is because 
anyone that uses a range more than once will often see the same target(s) in the same 
location(s) and often there is prescribed manner (orientation to the target(s)) that limits 
the options. Augmented reality will allow Marines to engage targets that can be seen and 
look real but can be quickly and easily relocated on ranges as well as modified to present 
varying levels of threat to the attacking force. Augmented reality will also significantly 
enhance collaborative planning. 
21. Human Behavior Representation and Artificial Intelligence 
The Marine Corps extensively used role players as part of Operation Iraqi 
Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom pre-deployment training because the human 
interaction is essential to developing cultural skills but also because current AI 
capabilities are less than adequate, too expensive, or both. With the focus on global crisis 
response (CMC, 2014) now, the Marine Corps must make considerable advancements in 
the cultural realism (human geography) of LVC-TE. This “culture” will be an additional 
layer on top of the worldwide terrain database requirement and should include the 
injection of avatars for specific targets (kinetic and non-kinetic) that have foreign 
language capabilities. Many current training systems provide exceptional decision 
making training to leaders because they allow for the normal friction inherent in the C2 
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of operations. The enhanced AI capabilities will greatly improve this decision making 
training because each individual decision and interaction with virtual avatars will have its 
own distinct realistic result and consequences. 
22. Environment Replication 
The science fiction objective has always been the Star Trek holodeck. With the 
holodeck capability in mind as the final objective, the Marine Corps needs to begin 
making strides towards replicating operational environments within its virtual simulators 
with enhanced visual, aural, olfactory, and touch stimulation.  
B. STRATEGY 
The vision for LVC-TE should be broad and audacious but should not be 
confused as something that the Marine Corps needs to fully achieve in a short-term. 
LVC-TE is a long-term capability with some aspects that the Marine Corps has not even 
thought of yet. As proven during LSE-14, there are many near-term capabilities that the 
Marine Corps can achieve but not without a cohesive strategy that will allow the 
necessary resources to be properly identified, prioritized, allocated, and applied in 
support of LVC-TE. 
1. New Start 
It still needs to be decided if LVC-TE will actually be a new program or will 
instead attempt to utilize funds via existing Marine Corps programs. Reluctance exists to 
make LVC-TE a new program and this reluctance needs to be nullified. LVC-TE needs to 
have its own separate line for funding and requirements in order to remain agnostic about 
other programs and properly serve as the primary materiel solution for the full concept. 
2. Educate the Marine Corps 
Few Marine Corps personnel understand the LVC-TE concept and capability and 
even fewer are in positions to directly assist in the development and implementation. 
Further development efforts will be insufficient or negative without educated 
participants. This education effort needs to be wide-spread initially and then presented in 
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a persistent manner via EdCom, MAGTFTC, and MSTP courses. The list of initial 
education venues includes at a minimum:   
a. GO Executive Off-Site 
b. Sergeants Major Symposium 
c. Boards 
(1) Command Element Advocacy Board (CEAB) 
(2)  Ground Board (GCE advocate) 
(3) Aviation Board (ACE advocate) 
(4) I&L Board (LCE advocate) 
(5) Marine Installations Board (Facilities) 
d. OAGs  
(6) GCE Combined OAG 
(7) I&L T&E OAG 
(8) Marine Air Control Group OAG 
(9) Unmanned Aerial System COAG 
(10) Aviation Ground Support OAG 
(11) ATS Training Management Team (TMT) 
(12) MAGTF T&E OAG 
(13) MEB OAG 
(14) MEU OAG 
(15) OST&E OAG 
e. Force Synchronization Conference 
f. Operations Summit 
g. Commander’s Course 
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h. I&I Conference 
i. Senior Gunner Symposium 
j. HQMC Action Officer Course 
k. TECOM 
(16) TECOM Action Officer Course 
(17) MSTP 
(18) MAGTFTC Commands 
 Marine Corps Tactics and Operations Group (MCTOG) 
 Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron-1 (MAWTS-1) 
 Marine Corps Logistics Operations Group (MCLOG) 
 Tactical Training Exercise Control Group 
 Mountain Warfare Training Center 
(19) EdCom Courses 
 Marine Corps War College 
 School of Advanced Warfighting 
 Command and Staff College (CSC) 
 Expeditionary Warfare School (EWS) 
 Staff non-commissioned officer (SNCO) Advanced Course 
 SNCO Career Course 
l. Naval Postgraduate School’s (NPS) Modeling, Virtual Environments 
and Simulation (MOVES) program 
 
 70
3. Identify LVC-TE Subject Matter Experts (SME) and Points of 
Contact (POC) 
Having the right personnel involved in developing LVC-TE is a necessity but 
cannot be achieved until the initial education piece is first achieved. The Marine Corps 
does not need a revolving door of participants waiting for organizations to get it right or 
finally realizing how important the effort is. There is a tendency within acquisitions to 
call any systems expert a SME. A SME must be a uniformed Marine that is not only an 
expert with a system but in that system’s application to support training and operations. 
This distinction, along with the right SMEs and POCs, is essential to future success. The 
majority of individuals involved with developing and implementing LVC-TE must be 
uniformed personnel—this cannot be something that is set-up for civilian management 
and heavy contractor support. While there are many qualified civilians that run programs 
throughout CD&I and MCSC, I believe that the LVC-TE capability will be such a daily 
part of Marine training that its development and sustainment must be overseen by a 
uniformed Marine. 
4. LVC-TE Working Group Charter 
When LVC-TE efforts in TECOM renewed in March 2013, there was an initial 
fervor to create a formal LVC-TE WG with a number of Sub-WGs. Though there was a 
formal LVC-IPT Charter to work on the ICD (TECOM, 2006) and though LVC-TE WG 
meetings were held by TECD on 20 March 2013, 22 January 2014, and 3 April 2014, 
there is still not a formalized core group of LVC-TE WG members or a formally stated 
purpose and objectives for the WG. This can be rectified by establishing a formal LVC-
TE WG Charter similar to the one for the ICD development and similar to the Training 
M&S WIPT Charter. I believe that the absence of a formal charter has been a contributor 
to the exclusivity of action officers that should be part of the process at this point. As part 
of the formal process to inform the Training M&S WIPT and MAGTF T&E OAG, a 
formal LVC-TE WG Charter needs to be established with a designated CIO (uniformed 
Marine) as the lead integrator (ideally that is his/her only duty).   Initial priorities of the 
LVC-TE WG are to re-assess prioritization of the ICD gaps, DOTMLPF-P assessment, 
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and generation of LVC-TE Sub-WGs to begin addressing these areas in more detail (Sub-
WG leaders should also be uniformed Marines). 
5. LVC-TE Roadmap 
The 2010 Training Modeling and Simulation (M&S) Master Plan provided a 
detailed plan to achieve a number of capabilities within LVC-TE but it has not been a 
document that the Marine Corps measured itself against in recent years. I believe that it 
was not streamlined enough to be user friendly (easily managed) and once some 
milestones were not met, the Training M&S establishment abandoned it as a guidebook. 
The 2014 Training M&S Master Plan (currently in final draft) will be the replacement 
document and provides greater flexibility. It also provides a general integration roadmap 
(Figure 28) and this will be a guiding tool but the Marine Corps still needs a much more  
  
Figure 28.  LVC-TE Integration Roadmap from new Master Plan  
(from TECD, 2014) 
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detailed LVC-TE roadmap to plan with and deviate from. Though all DOTMLPF-P 
actions should be part of this LVC-TE roadmap, the Marine Corps specifically needs a 
training systems/LVC-TE roadmap by which to plan better materiel acquisition 
strategies. The Marine Corps currently has no idea when any of its training systems are 
supposed to be disposed of, replaced by new systems, or merged with other systems. The 
Indoor Simulated Marksmanship Trainer (ISMT) is a great example of this. 
When I was a Naval Reserve Officer Training Command (Marine Corps option) 
midshipmen in 1994, I was introduced to the ISMT for the first time. It was a large screen 
with a projector, realistic but simulated weapons, and software to provide an interactive 
environment for marksmanship training.  20 years later, the ISMT has improved with 
more software capabilities, a larger set of weapons to train with, and some weapons are 
now connected by Bluetooth technology (as opposed to tethered lines) but the ISMT, for 
all practical purposes, is still the same concept and capability that it was two decades ago 
with no plan to replace it, dispose of it, or revolutionary change it for future years. Why is 
this?  How is it that hundreds of millions of dollars has been invested to provide a 
stagnant system that is not portable, requires significant training to operate, is not 
interoperable with other training systems, and requires “training” weapons to be utilized 
instead of Marines’ actual weapons in order to reduce costs and increase training 
effectiveness?  The reason is because that the ISMT, along with all other training 
systems, has no roadmap to follow and plan from.  
Weapons, aircraft, and other platforms have life-cycle plans by which the 
program offices can plan service life extensions, replacement, and disposal. Without an 
existing roadmap for Marine Corps training systems, PM TRASYS cannot do this 
planning. A detailed training systems roadmap is also essential for aligning training 
systems with critical C4I systems (e.g. Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System 
(AFATDS), Strikelink, VideoScout, etc.). 
Figure 29 is from the Marine Corps Aviation Plan and is often referred to as the 
AVPLAN (MROC, 2013). Though obviously lacking many details, this picture has made 
it very clear to Marine Corps planners what the objective is for the modernization of 
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Marine Corps aviation platforms. This same type of picture is needed for Marine Corps 
training systems and LVC-TE; Figure 27 currently falls short of doing so. 
 
Figure 29.  Marine Aviation Modernization Concept (AVPLAN)  
(from MROC, 2013) 
Figures 30 and 31 are examples pulled from IDs within the Capabilities 
Development Directorate at CD&I. There are numerous other roadmaps like these that 
can be found for many other communities and families of systems. As with the 
AVPLAN, there are more detailed plans that accompany these pictures but these visuals 
provide a clear message as to which systems support a particular community/function, 
when these systems are initially and fully operational, and how long these systems are 
needed to be in service. Similar roadmaps are needed that account for all current and 
future training systems and, then, a hybrid plan is needed for LVC-TE that infuses the 
ideas in Figure 28 with the AVPLAN concept. As a PJM for training systems and LVC- 
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Figure 30.  Route Reconnaissance and Clearance (R2C) Capability Road Map 
(from Rock, 2013) 
 
Figure 31.  Indirect Fire Capability Road Map (from Penella, 2014) 
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TE, I look at Figure 28 and am still unsure of what the final vision for LVC-TE looks like 
and what the plan is to get there. 
6. Improve Requirements Process for Training Systems 
Marine Corps training systems are rightfully criticized for having stove-piped 
capabilities. They have stove-piped capabilities because they have stove-piped 
requirements and they have stove-piped requirements because the Marine Corps has 
failed to follow a standard requirements process (for new as well as continuing 
improvements).   
a. Configuration Control 
Except for the case of MTWS, PM TRASYS has failed to hold regular CCBs on 
an annual basis, if even a bi-annual basis. This has been for a number of reasons but the 
normal excuses have been either that the systems already have requirements for 
enhancements (though those requirements may be old) or that funds are not available for 
enhancements so the CCB should be postponed until funds are available. In order to 
achieve the same synergy that the Training M&S WIPT and MAGTF T&E OAG can 
provide, PM TRASYS must hold annual CCBs for all training systems and do so in a 
manner similar to the T&R manual reviews and TMTs via a published Marine 
administrative instruction identifying the training system(s), dates, and location of the 
CCB. If it is possible and makes sense to combine CCBs or hold them in conjunction 
with the Training M&S WIPT, then that should be done as well. 
b. Training M&S WIPT 
Appendix D of the 2010 Training and Education Modeling and Simulation Master 
Plan is the Training M&S WIPT Charter. This Charter was signed by the CGs of 
TECOM, MCWL, and MCSC; the Deputy Chief at ONR; and the Senior Analyst at 
MCCDC.   The Charter clearly outlines the purpose of the Training M&S WIPT as 
(MTSD, 2010): 
“a. The Training M&S WIPT will provide an overarching forum to 
identify training M&S needs across the Marine Corps and it will serve as a 
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mechanism to address any identified gaps. The purpose of the Training 
M&S WIPT is to function as a training M&S information clearing house. 
“b. The goal of the Training M&S WIPT is to foster information 
exchange, identify needs/challenges, develop course of action to address 
identified needs, and to facilitate development of requirements 
documentation.” 
In order to emphasize the importance of the Training M&S WIPT, CG TECOM 
published TECOM Policy Letter 1–10 in 2010 as well. With a firm emphasis on the 
importance and far-reaching capability that LVC-TE will be able to provide the Marine 
Corps for training and mission rehearsal, the mission statement was very clear (TECOM, 
2010): 
“TECOM will establish a systematic and disciplined process to identify, 
prioritize, coordinate, and address training and education M&S issues in 
order to facilitate development and integration of live, virtual, and 
constructive training capabilities to meet Marine Corps training and 
education needs.” 
Despite the high level leadership involved in signing the Training M&S WIPT 
Charter and clear direction from CG TECOM on its importance and the need for it to be 
part of disciplined process (quarterly meetings), the Training M&S WIPT has only been 
held five times since; twice in 2010, twice in 2011, and the last was in March 2013. 
c. MAGTF T&E OAG 
The MAGTF T&E OAG was established in 2003 (MCCDC, 2003). As with the 
Training M&S WIPT, the purpose of the MAGTF T&E OAG is well stated (MCCDC, 
2003): 
“The MAGTF Training and Education Operational Advisory Group (T&E 
OAG) is chartered as a forum for establishing Marine Corps training and 
education priorities. The MAGTF T&E OAG provides interaction 
between Training and Education Command (TECOM), the operating 
forces, and the Advocates, in order to provide timely coordinated solutions 
for validated training and education requirements that have a critical 
impact for the Marine Corps.” 
The MAGTF T&E OAG has been held three times–once in 2003, May 2013, and 
March 2014. Where other OAGs that I have attended have resulted in top ten lists of 
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priorities, neither of the last two MAGTF T&E OAGs has produced a list of priorities. 
The MAGTF OAGs have instead been used more as an opportunity for TECOM to pass 
on information to the operating forces and advocates and receive concerns back in return. 
This may be because many T&E priorities can be identified and socialized at other OAGs 
(i.e. GCE COAG, I&L T&E OAG, Aviation OAGs) and TECOM is not looking to 
duplicate efforts but there are no other OAGs available to directly address LVC-TE, thus, 
LVC-TE issues routinely lack institutional socialization and prioritization. 
d. Lack of Synchronization 
The failure to conduct the MAGTF T&E OAG and Training M&S WIPT in a 
synchronized and recurring manner has allowed the training systems requirement process 
to become stale and has atrophied institutional knowledge of training systems and LVC. 
If conducted properly, the Training M&S WIPT will allow the Marine Corps to directly 
address training system requirements for interoperability and those decisions can be 
presented to the MAGTF T&E OAG for concurrence or reprioritization in accordance 
with the full training and education spectrum of LVC-TE that TECOM is responsible for. 
The outputs from the MAGTF T&E OAG should then be presented at the GO CEAB for 
proper alignment with MAGTF priorities. If this process was conducted semi-annually 
(as is done in other communities), it would greatly assist in establishing institutional 
understanding of training systems and LVC-TE. It would just as importantly allow for 
validation of current and future requirements to support interoperability across training 
systems and the MAGTF. The Marine Corps will continue to kick the LVC-TE can down 
the road until it is willing  
7. Science and Technology 
Many capabilities within the LVC-TE vision are years, possibly decades away, from 
reality. S&T is a critical element for LVC-TE to reach FOC and efforts across the 
numerous S&T agencies (Defense Advanced Research Project Agency, ONR, ARL, etc.) 
must be tracked, prioritized, and aligned wherever possible. LVC-TE concepts should be 
akin to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration with regards to new 
capabilities—S&T efforts within LVC-TE may not always lead to a direct LVC-TE 
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capability but may often result in a capability to support other training programs or 
warfighting functions.  
8. Industry and Academia Involvement 
The Marine Corps has allowed a delay in the LVC-TE materiel solution 
development to stagnate its knowledge and intellectual development on the subject. The 
Marine Corps’ focus on identifying system integration requirements has inadvertently 
resulted in a significant delay towards all other aspects across the DOTLMPF-P 
spectrum. This does not mean that the Marine Corps does not have some well qualified 
and knowledgeable experts on LVC-TE but, as an institution, the Marine Corps has not 
attempted to increase the number of experts and informed personnel.   
The Marine Corps is about a decade behind the Army, Navy, and Air Force with 
regards to actually developing enterprise LVC capabilities. With LSE-14, the good news 
is that the Marine Corps is potentially leading the way with regards to more complete 
virtual and live interoperability. There are enough common interests as well to allow the 
Marine Corps to do some quick catching up through lessons learned and continued 
interactions with the other services. The true ability to take a giant leap forward thought 
will take place once the Marine Corps fully gets industry and academia involved. It is not 
that industry and academia are not doing anything that can support the Marine Corps 
now, it is that much more can be done, without expense to the Marine Corps, with a full 
vision and clear capabilities established for those institutions to set their sights on. 
Though academia is focused on knowledge growth and industry is focused on profit 
growth, they both can equally gain from tackling Marine Corps LVC-TE capability 
requirements but will be hesitant to invest resources if they do not see a long-term 
commitment and institutional plan from the Marine Corps that provides a potential return 
on their investments. After confirming ICD gap priorities again, the Marine Corps needs 
immediately to conduct industry days and ask industry and academia for white papers 
and thesis efforts in order to expand knowledge at a faster pace and reduced cost than the 
Marine Corps can do on its own. 
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9. Experimentation 
The LVC-TE CONOPS focuses on LVC-TE support for MEBs, MEUS, and 
SPMAGTFs—that is where Marine Corps experimentation should focus as well. PM 
TRASYS has begun an initial relationship with the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab 
(MCWL) but it has been nothing more than an exchange of information on each 
organization’s current projects and objectives. MCWL should be an internal part of LVC-
TE experimentation efforts—particularly with regard to SPMAGTFs and MEUs. The 
Force Synchronization Conference should be used as an opportunity to target 
SPMAGTFs and MEUs for experimentation efforts. MEB training and mission rehearsal 
will become the model for LVC-TE and MEBs will likely be the MAGTF that benefits 
the most. The annual LSE should have an experimentation requirement. MAGTFTC, 
MSTP, and the participating MEB should be tasked to experiment with LVC-TE in order 
to improve training for the primary and secondary training audiences while reducing cost. 
Joint experimentation should be targeted with select Army (semi-annual Network 
Integration Evaluation), Navy (annual Bold Alligator with II MEF), and Air Force 
(Virtual Flag) exercises as well. 
C. EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 21 
As the Marine Corps has begun to pull itself away from combat operations in 
Afghanistan, it has refocused on being the crisis response force for the United States. The 
vision for designing and developing the force to meet these responsibilities is EF-21. EF-
21 has been presented as a Capstone Concept that is central to further Marine Corps 
planning. As stated by General Amos, Commandant of the Marine Corps, “…it is more 
than a vision – it is also an actionable plan and a disciplined process to shape and guide 
our capability and capacity decisions while respecting our country’s very real need to 
regain budgetary discipline. Through Expeditionary Force 21 we will chart a course over 
the next 10 years to field a Marine Corps that will be: the right force in the right place at 
the right time.”  (HQMC, 2014) 
LVC-TE concepts and capabilities support a number of elements and objectives 
within EF-21. A significant portion of the vision and strategy for LVC-TE should focus 
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on aligning with EF-21 in order to better meet future Marine Corps requirements. The 
following is a summary of those key elements and objectives within EF-21 and how 
LVC-TE can support. 
1. C2, Fires, Intelligence, and Logistics Integration 
Most Marine Corps training systems have integrated tactical radios, BFT, and 
C2PC or can directly stimulate those and other C4I systems. Additionally, many training 
systems have a focus on combined arms training with integrated C4I systems such as 
AFATDS, Target Location Designation Handoff System, and VideoScout. The Marine 
Corps has proven the technical ability and training benefits of linking ATS with MAGTF 
training systems and can bring in live or virtual unmanned aerial systems as well. LVC-
TE can grow into a holistic fusion of systems that further links naval surface fires and 
joint ATS. A gap in Marine Corps logistics training remains at the operational level 
because most training events and exercises are often too short in duration to stress 
operational logistics. LVC-TE can provide a robust virtual world in which logisticians 
can be involved before and after event execution and thus encounter operational issues 
that often fail to be replicated today. By continuing to integrate and link training systems 
and C4I systems within the EF-21 and LVC-TE concepts, the MAGTF can have a 
persistent and dynamic environment in which to achieve T&R across these warfighting 
functions. 
2. Joint, Coalition, Maritime, Naval, and Special Operations Forces 
Integration 
 LVC is a global objective and the other services (including Special Operations 
Command and the Coast Guard) and many international partners and allies are generally 
on parallel paths developing their own capabilities. LVC-TE efforts can be integrated 
with theirs to provide a readily available T&R capability that allows MAGTFs to better 
develop habitual relationships, standard operating procedures, and conduct mission 
rehearsals without the need to use exhaustive resources (i.e., aircraft, armor, ships) or be 
co-located until ready for a live assessment or actual crisis response. 
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3. Security Cooperation 
Whether developed by them or provided by the United States, many partners and 
allies are using LVC capabilities or want to develop them. The Marine Corps can 
leverage this to better achieve theater engagement and security cooperation at a reduced 
cost. LVC-TE can be a critical link in this endeavor as a means to better integrate 
tactically and operationally while reducing deployment of personnel to those countries. 
4. Situational Awareness, Decision Making, Experimentation, and 
Wargaming 
The Marine Corps is continually seeking to make its leaders and organizations 
more dynamic and efficient in solving problems. Much of this training comes from giving 
Marines experiences in which they can develop better situational awareness, learn from 
their successes and mistakes, and feel free to try new things. LVC-TE can provide those 
experiences from the individual level to senior executives and do so in a manner that is 
repeatable, cost effective, tutorial in nature, and accessible to every Marine.  
5. Return on Investment 
Though the Marine Corps is continually assessing training effectiveness, studies 
have shown that training systems can provide training at substantially lower costs than 
live training (GAO, 2011) (PM TRASYS, 2014a). Previously mentioned efficiencies of 
LVC-TE are that it can train distributed forces, replicate the use of resource exhaustive 
equipment, quickly repeat training events without expending additional resources, and 
reduce maintenance requirements—all of this equates to cost savings. Measurable time 
savings additionally come from the quick reset from one training event to the next along 
with comprehensive AARs (including 3D playback with voice overlay) that accelerate 
the learning cycle. 
D. IMMEDIATE ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN 
The LVC-TE problem is intricate but near-term and long-term solutions are available that 
do not require extensive resources. As with many problems, solutions start with 
leadership. The Marine Corps needs a clear signal from senior leadership in the form of a 
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well-articulated vision and planning guidance. That vision should align with how LVC-
TE will support EF-21 goals and that guidance should focus on immediately addressing 
T&E and integration gaps. 
1. Training, Leadership and Education 
The Marine Corps does not need to start from scratch to formally introduce LVC-
TE into its T&E continuum (Figure 32). Valid curriculum examples exist within the 
Army’s FA57 (Simulation Operations) school; NPS’s MOVES program; MSTP 
instruction; and Infantry Weapons Officer Course (IWOC) learning objectives.  
 
Figure 32.  TECOM T&E Continuum concept (from TECOM, 2013a) 
a. LVC-TE in Support of Training Plans 
One of the current gaps that exist is the ability for Marines to know how to apply 
training systems and LVC-TE capabilities against unit training plans. In effort to start to 
correct this deficiency, the Gunners community has identified learning objectives as part 
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of the IWOC. Though developed specifically for the Gunners’ needs, this terminal 
learning objective (TLO) and enabling learning objectives (ELO) can be applied to 
formal train-the-trainer courses. 
(1) TLO: 0306-TRNG-2002 Given a training scenario, advise on the 
incorporation of simulations to enhance training. 
(2) ELO: 0306-TRNG-2002a Given a scenario, training plan, METLs, 
references, simulations, and regulations, conduct cross analysis to match simulations with 
training requirements. 
(3) ELO: 0306-TRNG-2002b Given a scenario, training plan, METLs, 
references, SDZs, simulations, and regulations, incorporate simulations into training plan 
to meet the commander’s intent. 
(4) ELO: 0306-TRNG-2002c Given a completed training event using 
simulations, conduct an After Action Review (AAR) to correct the identified training 
deficiencies. 
(5)  ELO: 0306-TRNG-2002d Given a completed training event using 
simulations and an after action review (AAR), communicate results of AAR to higher to 
report simulation capability/limitations. 
In response to a request from the IWOC, I provided a two-day period of 
instruction to the newest class of Gunners in July 2014. Figures 33 through 36 below are 
extracted slides that I provided in order to meet the TLO and ELOs. Though further 
analysis and application development is needed by more Marines, I believe that this 
provides an actionable set of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for Marines to 
apply training systems and LVC-TE against their unit training plans. 
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Figure 33.  Examples of when to use training systems 
 
Figure 34.  Method for determining what aspects of L-V-C to use  
(after FA57, 2014) 
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Figure 35.  Recommendations for getting locally trained and educated 
 
Figure 36.  How to apply training systems against your training plan 
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b. Focus for Implementation 
The Marine Corps needs to identify whom and where T&E for LVC-TE is to be 
provided. Education should be provided across EdCom but focused towards CSC, EWS, 
SNCO Advanced Course, and SNCO Career Course. Training should be focused towards 
MSTP and the professional courses under MAGTFTC. The MAGTFTC courses are those 
provided by the MCTOG (GCE focus), MCLOG (LCE focus), and MAWTS-1 (ACE 
focus). They collectively produce tactics instructors (TIs) through their extensive 
curriculums. Those TIs are operations and tactics instructors (OTI) (MCTOG), 
intelligence and tactics instructors (ITI) (MCTOG), expeditionary logistics (ELI) 
(MCLOG), and weapons and tactics instructors (WTI) (MAWTS-1). These instructors 
should become the backbone of LVC-TE ingenuity and employment in the Marine Corps. 
Demonstrated on the front end of the MAGTF Training Program in Figure 37; the TIs are 
well situated to have an impact throughout all unit level training. 
 
Figure 37.  The MAGTF Training Program (from TECOM, 2013b) 
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2. Integration, Materiel, and Facilities 
The solution for these areas relies on formally assigning personnel and adhering 
to processes. First, a CIO must be assigned to take LVC-TE process ownership. This 
individual should be a field grade officer with MAGTF staff experience. Lead action 
officers for the affected areas within the Marine Corps must be assigned as well. Once 
unity of command is established, then the Marine Corps can achieve unity of effort 
through integrated processes. Specific to training systems and LVC-TE, there are 
available processes for proper socialization, prioritization, and decisions to be made. 
Though currently held independently and irregularly, the Training M&S WIPT and 
MAGTF T&E OAG can provide the forums and sustained process for continued LVC-TE 
development in connection with other Marine Corps processes. Using the model followed 
by PP&O and the knowledge gained throughout my studies on this issue, Figure 38 is my 
































































Figure 38.  Proposed Training System and LVC-TE Process. 
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The lack of a CIO being assigned (in any capacity) to LVC-TE means that there is 
no control point for anything right now—information is not pulled and pushed from/to 
one single point, service level guidance is not being provided across HQMC agencies and 
the Marine Force (MARFOR) commands, and the DOTMLPF-P gaps are not being 
addressed through coordinated enterprise activities. Marine Corps LVC-TE achievements 
in 2014 have been somewhat by happenstance and certainly not by design.  
Figure 39 is my identification of the key stakeholders for LVC-TE. As the title of 
the figure suggests, LVC-TE is a complicated issue and objective for the Marine Corps. 
The capabilities and T&R efficiency gains that have been presented in this paper will be 
delayed, immature, wrong, or simply never seen unless a full vision and strategy is 
developed and implemented. 
 




The Marine Corps is in the same position as the other military services—
resources are decreasing while mission requirements remain steady and often increasing. 
Readiness is the key to achieving mission requirements—readiness with regards to 
training, manpower, equipment, and having Marines in the right places to respond to 
crisis. In order to be poised for this crisis response, the Marine Corps’ has developed the 
EF-21 capstone concept. All readiness capabilities will need to support EF-21. LVC-TE 
offers the opportunity to dramatically change the way the Marine Corps achieves 
readiness in this resource challenged environment. In order for the Marine Corps to be 
poised to integrate LVC-TE’s capabilities, LVC-TE must be included in institutional 
planning. 
A. NEAR-TERM FOCUS 
The primary near-term objective of LVC-TE is to take many of the Marine Corps’ 
current training systems and allow them to operate together in a near-seamless and 
distributed manner (TECD, 2014). While necessary, this objective will prove to be 
cumbersome and costly if the Marine Corps continues to try and move forward without a 
designated CIO, identified actions officers across HQMC, and without a prescriptive 
process being followed. 
B. LONG-TERM PLANNING AND OPPORTUNITIES 
Without a firm understanding of the acquisitions process, I can see how one 
would read through this paper and think that the Marine Corps cannot afford many of the 
pursuits of LVC-TE–many components rely on undeveloped technology and a robust 
infrastructure that is not planned for–while competing against other programs and 
concerns within the Marine Corps. That is not the case. The Marine Corps does not need 
to direct the establishment of a new large IPT and program officer to manage this and 
does not need to allocate funds by taking away from other programs, but the Marine 
Corps also cannot wait for LVC-TE to fall in its lap. There are enough other agencies 
involved in these issues that the Marine Corps can leverage the work and resources of 
 90
others. The Marine Corps can even lead, or at least influence, these agencies to achieve 
specific Marine Corps requirements but not without engaged leadership, a vision and 
strategy, and an empowered CIO who can navigate the Marine Corps to positions of 
opportunity. 
LVC-TE is not science fiction. Though some technology requirements still 
require maturity or have not even been identified yet, there is no deficiency in the number 
of organizations (in and out of the military) who are conducting research and 
development with relation to LVC-TE. Without a holistic vision and strategy that spans 
across the Marine Corps though, these organizations are generally unaware of how they 
can potentially tailor their efforts to fit LVC-TE and the Marine Corps is not able to 
engage these organizations as an educated user. There is still time for the Marine Corps to 
correct this and become a leader in this area. 
C. FINAL THOUGHTS 
The average Marine (including commanders) cannot look at any current LVC-TE 
vision products and statements and gain an implied understanding of how substantially 
LVC-TE will affect and support them. As such, they do not realize that this is a concept 
and capability that they must be engaged in so that it will properly support them now and 
in the future. Without a bolder and more comprehensive vision for LVC-TE, Marines and 
their leaders will continue to ignore it and LVC-TE will continue to fall short of its 
potential and of what the Marine Corps requires in order to achieve and maintain T&R in 
a fiscal environment that constantly requires greater efficiencies to be gained and 
demonstrated. 
The technology cycle of the world is at an ever increasing pace that is quite 
simply in conflict with the acquisitions and FYDP cycles of the Marine Corps. The 
Marine Corps needs to be in a position to incorporate these technologies as they offer a 
cost-savings method to achieve T&R. While the Marine Corps may be facing budget 
limitations, the means by which it can achieve T&R, specifically for EF-21, are more 
robust than ever. LVC-TE will be a capability that is greater than the sum of its parts. 
LVC-TE will only be limited by the imagination of Marines but they cannot imagine new 
 91
possibilities if they are not aware of LVC-TE and its components. The Marine Corps can 
either institutionally continue to fall back on what it has done in the past (resource 
intensive live training and imperfect constructive training) or it can get out of its comfort 
zone and truly be the innovative organization that it claims to be by aggressively 
developing and implementing LVC-TE in order to achieve EF-21 goals under limited 
resources. This requires systemic change but systemic change cannot be achieved without 
a systemic plan. In order to do so, the Marine Corps needs to truly establish a vision and 
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APPENDIX A. USAGE REPORT DATA PROVIDED  
TO PM TRASYS 
A. Operator Driver Simulator, 29 Palms, CA – February 2011 to December 
2012 
Date  # Trained  Miles     Date  #Trained  Mileage 
Feb‐11  77  3865    Jan‐13 114  651
Mar‐11  105  3300    Feb‐13 112 VIP  303
Apr‐11  155  4437    Mar‐13 70  687
May‐11  65  1569    Apr‐13 85  1,356
Jun‐11  139  3474    May‐13 4  94
Jul‐11  141  3947    Jun‐13 56  1,101
Aug‐11  130  3316    Jul‐13 80  1,904
Sep‐11  126  3822    Aug‐13 80  914
Oct‐11  100  3384    Sep‐13 100  1,854
Nov‐11  93  2301    Oct‐13 26  620
Dec‐11  19  539    Nov‐13 41  904
Jan‐12  51  1553    Dec‐13 0  0
Feb‐12  48  1408    Jan‐14 190  1,679
Mar‐12  65  2016    Feb‐14 73  2,073
Apr‐12  66  2002    Mar‐14 5  124
May‐12  154  3480    Apr‐14 75  1,456
Jun‐12  95  1748    May‐14      
Jul‐12  57  1641    Jun‐14      
Aug‐12  112  3033    Jul‐14      
Sep‐12  61  1918    Aug‐14      
Oct‐12  143  3070    Sep‐14      
Nov‐12  61  1316    Oct‐14      
Dec‐12  22  524    Nov‐14      
            Dec‐14      
                    
                    
Totals  2085  57663            















































































































































































































































































C. Indoor Simulated Marksmanship Trainers, Camp Lejeune, North 
Carolina – October 2012 To August 2013 
 
D. Supporting Arms Virtual Trainer, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina – 
October 2012 To September 2013 
 
 101
APPENDIX B. CACCTUS INITIAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN 
A. FY13:  
1. New Capability 
a. CCB Part 2—Fuses, Corrections, Trajectory (CDD 6.1.4, 6.1.11, 6.2.1, 
6.2.5.4, 6.2.5.5, 6.2.3.11, 6.2.5.1, 6.2.5.4) 
b. Amphibious Operations—Phase I (CDD 6.2.1; 6.2.3.11) 
c. Backward compatibility for scenario development (CDD 6.2.3.13) 
d. After Action Review System—Phase II (CDD 6.1.9) 
e. VBS2 Integration—Phase II (CDD 6.2.2) 
f. Battery-level AFATDS functionality (CDD 6.1.7.1, 6.1.12) 
g. Return on Investment/Cost Avoidance 
h. Virtual Tactical Bridge enhancements (CDD 6.1.7) 
i. New terrain: Korea, Camp Pendleton, 29 Palms, Hawaii MOUT (CDD 
6.1.8) 
j. Increase CACCTUS-OneSAF entity count to 3000 entities (CDD 6.1.4) 
k. OneSAF Virtualization 
2. Sustainment 
a. PDSS (PTR resolution, IA maintenance, CM, C4ISR upgrades, Terrain) 
b. Hardware refresh Camp Lejeune 
c. OneSAF-CACCTUS step up/integration 
 
B. FY14: 
1. New Capability 
a. Amphibious Operations—Phase II (CDD 6.2.1, 6.2.3.11) 
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b. Regimental-level (RCT) Exercise Capability (CDD 6.2.1) 
(1) 5K Semi-Autonomous Force (SAF) entities CDD 6.1.4) 
(2) COP Management / COC interface (SAF and HITL to C4I) (CDD 6.1.12, 
6.1.7.1) 
(3) MAGTF C2—TBMCS, CAPSET III COC, MiRC Chat, PASS/DDS, 
VOIP, JADOCS 
(4) CCSM Enhancements (CDD 6.2.4) 
c. Distributed Operations—Phase I (CDD 6.2.1, 6.2.2) CAST-to-CAST 
d. Improved Fires Capabilities (CDD 6.2.3.11, 6.2.5.4, 6.2.5.5) Realistic 
Trajectories, shell/fuze combos, and air burst 
e. Environment Effects– Phase I (CDD 6.1.11, 6.2.3.8) Night Ops / All 
Weather Ops 
f. Tailored Vulnerability Models (CDD 6.1.6) 
2.        Sustainment 
a.  PDSS (PTR resolution, IA maintenance, CM, C4ISR upgrades, Terrain) 
b.  Hardware refresh Camp Pendleton 
c.  OneSAF-CACCTUS step up/integration 
 
C. FY15: 
1.   New Capability 
a. Current Threat OPFOR modeling improvements (CDD 6.1.5, 6.2.3.3, 
6.2.5.4) 
b.  Distributed Operations—Phase II (CDD 6.1.1, 6.2.1, 6.2.2) 
(1) Flight simulator distributed integration (F/A-18, AC-130, 
A/V-8B, M/V-22) (CDD 6.2.2.1, 6.1.11) 
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(2) MISTE / LVC-TE integration—Phase I (CDD 6.2.2.2, 6.2.2.3) 
(3) Interoperability with VMU UAS Shadow simulator (CDD 6.2.3.9, 6.2.2.1) 
(4) CACCTUS with HLA (CDD 6.2.2.3) 
(5) AAR—Phase III (CDD 6.1.9, 6.2.2.2) 
c. Upgrades to Marine Digital Voice (MDV) (CDD 6.1.7) 
d. Environmental Effects—Phase II (CDD 6.2.3.8, 6.1.11) Wind drift and 
dispersion (NBC) 
e. Add Aural/Sound indications to system  
2. Sustainment 
a.  PDSS (PTR resolution, IA maintenance (IV&V), CM, C4ISR upgrades, 
Terrain) 
b. Hardware refresh Marine Corps Base Kaneohe Hawaii 
c. OneSAF-CACCTUS step up/integration (20K+ entities) 
 
D.       FY16: 
1.       New Capability 
a.  MEB level exercise capability (CDD 6.2.1) 
(1) DASC, TACP, TACC, FDCs and FSCCs requires additional organic C4I 
(CDD 6.1.12) 
(2) More complex modeling and Semi-Autonomous Forces (SAF) behaviors 
(CDD 6.1.4, 6.1.5) 
b.  Distributed Operations—Phase III (CDD 6.1.1, 6.2.1, 6.2.2) 




2.       Sustainment 
a.  PDSS (PTR resolution, IA maintenance, CM, C4ISR upgrades, Terrain, 
MISTE / LVC-TE sustainment) 
b.  Refresh Camp Butler, Okinawa 
c.  New Army OneSAF-CACCTUS step up/integration 
 
E.       FY17:  
1.        New Capability 
a.  Distributed Operations—Phase IV (CDD 6.1.1, 6.2.1, 6.2.2) 
b.  MISTE / LVC-TE Phase III (CDD 6.2.2.2, 6.2.2.3) 
2. Sustainment 
a. PDSS (PTR resolution, IA maintenance, CM, C4ISR upgrades, Terrain, 
MISTE / LVC-TE sustainment) 
b. Hardware Upgrades 
c. New Army OneSAF-CACCTUS step up/integration (30K+) 
d. CACCTUS VV&A in preparation for FOC 
 
F.       FY18: (FOC) - Sustainment 
1. PDSS (PTR resolution, IA maintenance (IV&V), CM, C4ISR 
upgrades, Terrain, MISTE / LVC-TE sustainment) 
2. Hardware Upgrades 
3. New Army OneSAF-CACCTUS step up/integration (30K+) 
4. CACCTUS VV&A in preparation for FOC  
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APPENDIX C. CACCTUS REVISED DEVELOPMENT PLAN  
A.  FY13:  
1. New Capability 
a. CCB Part 2—Fuses, Corrections, Trajectory (CDD 6.1.4, 6.1.11, 
6.2.1, 6.2.5.4, 6.2.5.5, 6.2.3.11, 6.2.5.1, 6.2.5.4) (ensure realistic effects 
on target w/ dispersion) 
b. Battery-level AFATDS functionality (CDD 6.1.7.1, 6.1.12) 
c. VBS2 Integration—Phase II (CDD 6.2.2) (based on results of Phase I; 
independent hardware enhancement) 
d. Amphibious Operations—Phase I (CDD 6.2.1; 6.2.3.11) (provide NSFS 
capability; NGF IFW) 
e. FBCB2 Integration (dependent on receipt of equipment) 
f. Return on Investment/Cost Avoidance (ensure ability to pull separate 
daily/scenario/exercise reports, every munition, how encompassing does 
report need to be (T&R events, personnel trained)) 
g. OneSAF Virtualization (putting headless nodes on racks) 
h. Distributed Operations—Phase I (CDD 6.2.1, 6.2.2) (exploratory, proof 
of concept?, clock synchronization) 
i. After Action Review System—Phase II (CDD 6.1.9) (will help to first 
use current AAR ability) 
j. Backward compatibility for scenario development (CDD 6.2.3.13) 
(moved to FY15, initial capability will be part of 6.0) 
k. Virtual Tactical Bridge enhancements (CDD 6.1.7) (NAVAIR task) 
l. New terrain: Korea, Camp Pendleton, 29 Palms, Hawaii MOUT (CDD 
6.1.8) 
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m. Increase CACCTUS-OneSAF entity count to 3000 entities (CDD 6.1.4) 
2.  Sustainment 
a. PDSS (PTR resolution, IA maintenance, CM, C4ISR upgrades, Terrain) 
b.  Hardware refresh Camp Lejeune; IOS v1 hardware/software replacement; 
FBCB2 fielding 
c. OneSAF-CACCTUS step up/integration 
 
B.  FY14: 
1.  New Capability 
a. Regiment operations 
(1) Regimental-level (RCT) Exercise Capability (CDD 6.2.1) 
(2) 5K Semi-Autonomous Force (SAF) entities CDD 6.1.4) 
(3) COP Management / COC interface (SAF and HITL to C4I) (CDD 6.1.12, 
6.1.7.1) 
(4) MAGTF C2—TBMCS, CAPSET III COC, MiRC Chat, PASS/DDS, 
VOIP, JADOCS 
(5) CCSM Enhancements (CDD 6.2.4) 
b. Amphibious Operations—Phase II (CDD 6.2.1, 6.2.3.11) (ship-to-shore 
movements, what can we gain first from tie in with other systems?) 
c.   Environment Effects (CDD 6.1.11, 6.2.3.8) (depends on 3D viewer, 
may not be necessary) Wind drift and dispersion (NBC) / Night Ops / All 
Weather Ops 
d. Tailored Vulnerability Models (CDD 6.1.6) 
e.  Distributed Operations—Phase I (CDD 6.2.1, 6.2.2) (moved to FY13) 
CAST-to-CAST 
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f.    Improved Fires Capabilities (CDD 6.2.3.11, 6.2.5.4, 6.2.5.5) (CCB Part 2 
should account for this but will reevaluate after deployed) Realistic 
Trajectories, shell/fuze combos, and air burst 
2.        Sustainment 
a.  PDSS (PTR resolution, IA maintenance, CM, C4ISR upgrades, Terrain) 
b.  Hardware refresh Camp Pendleton 
c.  OneSAF-CACCTUS step up/integration 
 
C. FY15: 
1. New Capability 
a. Current Threat OPFOR modeling improvements (CDD 6.1.5, 6.2.3.3, 
6.2.5.4) 
b. Distributed Operations—Phase II (CDD 6.1.1, 6.2.1, 6.2.2) 
(1) Flight simulator distributed integration (F/A-18, C-130, 
A/V-8B, M/V-22, F-35, RW?) (CDD 6.2.2.1, 6.1.11) 
(2) MISTE / LVC-TE integration—Phase I (CDD 6.2.2.2, 6.2.2.3) 
(3) Interoperability with VMU UAS Shadow simulator (CDD 6.2.3.9, 6.2.2.1) 
(4) CACCTUS with HLA (CDD 6.2.2.3) 
(5) AAR—Phase III (CDD 6.1.9, 6.2.2.2) 
c. Upgrades to Marine Digital Voice (MDV) (CDD 6.1.7) 
      d.   Backward compatibility for scenario development (CDD 6.2.3.13) (moved 
from FY13—assess for MSDL and C2PC translation needs) 
e.   Environmental Effects—Phase II (CDD 6.2.3.8, 6.1.11) (combine into one 
effort in FY14) Wind drift and dispersion (NBC) 
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f.   Add Aural/Sound indications to system (plan to include in VBS2 hardware 
enhancement in FY13) 
2.         Sustainment 
a. PDSS (PTR resolution, IA maintenance (IV&V), CM, C4ISR upgrades, 
Terrain) 
b. Hardware refresh Marine Corps Base Kaneohe Hawaii 
c. OneSAF-CACCTUS step up/integration (20K+ entities) 
 
D.  FY16: 
1. New Capability 
a. MEB level exercise capability (CDD 6.2.1) 
b. DASC, TACP, TACC, FDCs and FSCCs requires additional organic C4I 
(CDD 6.1.12) and more complex modeling and Semi-Autonomous Forces 
(SAF) behaviors (CDD 6.1.4, 6.1.5) 
c. Distributed Operations—Phase III (CDD 6.1.1, 6.2.1, 6.2.2) 
      d.   MISTE / LVC-TE Phase II (CDD 6.2.2.2, 6.2.2.3) 
2. Sustainment 
a. PDSS (PTR resolution, IA maintenance, CM, C4ISR upgrades, Terrain, 
MISTE / LVC-TE sustainment) 
b. Refresh Camp Butler, Okinawa 
c. New Army OneSAF-CACCTUS step up/integration 
 
E.  FY17:  
1. New Capability 
a. Distributed Operations—Phase IV (CDD 6.1.1, 6.2.1, 6.2.2) 
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b.  MISTE / LVC-TE Phase III (CDD 6.2.2.2, 6.2.2.3) 
2. Sustainment 
a. PDSS (PTR resolution, IA maintenance, CM, C4ISR upgrades, Terrain, 
MISTE / LVC-TE sustainment) 
b. Hardware Upgrades 
c. New Army OneSAF-CACCTUS step up/integration (30K+) 
     d.   CACCTUS VV&A in preparation for FOC 
 
F. FY18: (FOC) - Sustainment 
1. PDSS (PTR resolution, IA maintenance (IV&V), CM, C4ISR 
upgrades, Terrain, MISTE / LVC-TE sustainment) 
2. Hardware Upgrades 
3. New Army OneSAF-CACCTUS step up/integration (30K+) 
4. CACCTUS VV&A in preparation for FOC 
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APPENDIX D. BRIEFINGS, MEETINGS, AND CONFERENCES 
A. April 2013, GCE COAG, Quantico, Virginia 
B. August 2013, Senior Gunner’s Symposium, Quantico, Virginia 
C. August 2013, PP&O POG Advocates, Washington, D.C. 
D. August 2013, I&L LPC-3 Advocate, Washington, D.C. 
E. August 2013, DC, CD&I, C2ID 
F. August 2013, Director MTESD 
G. September 2013, Inspector and instructor Conference, New Orleans, 
Louisiana 
H. September 2013, DC, CD&I, FMID, MID, and LID, Quantico, Virginia 
I. October 2013, USMC M&S IPT, Quantico, Virginia 
J. November 2013, LSE-14 IPC, 29 Palms, California 
K. November 2013, I&L T&E OAG, 29 Palms, California 
L. November 2013, NPS MOVES Brown Bag, Monterrey, CAlifornia 
(telecon) 
M. December 2013, MAGTF Fires OAG, Quantico, Virginia (telecon) 
N. December 2013, I/ITSEC, Orlando, Florida 
O. January 2014, i mef commanding general, Camp Pendleton, California 
P. January 2014, I MEF Proof of Concept, Camp Pendleton, California 
Q. February 2014, I MEF LVC WG, Orlando, Florida 
R. February 2014, LSE-14 MPC, 29 Palms, California 
S. March 2014, MAGTF T&E OAG, Quantico, Virginia 
T. March 2014, APW-71, APX, and POG, Washington, D.C. 
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U. April 2014, The Basic School, Quantico, Virginia 
V. April 2014, Combat Marksmanship Symposium, Quantico, Virginia 
W. April 2014, OAD study group, Quantico, Virginia 
X. April 2014, USMC M&S IPT, Quantico, Virginia 
Y. April 2014, ATF&PD, Quantico, Virginia 
Z. May 2014, LSE-14 FPC, 29 Palms, California 
AA. May 2014, I&L T&E OAG, 29 Palms, California 
BB. 3–5 June 2014, MAGTF Fires OAG, Quantico, Virginia 
CC. 24–26 June 2014, I MEF LVC Summit, Orlando, Florida 
DD. 8 July 2014, IWOC instruction, Quantico, Virginia 
EE. July 2014, HQMC Action Officers, Washington, D.C. 
FF. July 2014, Director ATF&P, Quantico, Virginia 
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